The Unresolved Questions of the Sahel Crisis

The formation of the Sahel Alliance has raised several questions, especially: is it really the worst thing in the world that three African military leaders want to rid their countries of neocolonialism and French imperialism?

In 2023, the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) originated as a mutual defence pact between Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso in response to the threat of military intervention by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) following the Niger coup. However, the mutual defence pact has since morphed into an alliance with a goal to pool resources, implement a monetary union and federalize into a sovereign state. Though initially motivated by a shared resistance to ECOWAS’s perceived neocolonial influence, the alliance represents a rejection of Western imposition in favour of a new narrative of self-determination and regional collaboration. The AES leaders interpreted ECOWAS’s military threats as not merely a challenge to their sovereignty, but also as an infringement upon the agency of the Sahelian people, who have longed for autonomy from external agendas that have historically undermined their governance.

Despite the creation of ECOWAS half a century ago, there is still an absence of institutionalized regional cooperation among West African countries. This is strikingly like the Middle East, where the struggle to find balance and equitable cooperation amidst persisting security dilemmas, competing economies, recurrent conflicts, and strong international influence continues. The recent decision by Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to form the AES has raised several questions: What are the true intentions of the military leaders of these countries? Can their motives be questioned when they claim to resist meddling in their sovereign affairs? What does the alliance with the Russia Africa Corps/Wagner group (and by extension, Russia) mean for weapons trade in combating religious extremism? How will the power vacuum created by the departure of French and American peacekeepers affect the region? Is ECOWAS’ call for a return to constitutional/democratic governance the right move for citizens of these countries? Further, is ECOWAS’s current strategy of issuing ultimatums and threatening military action effective in negotiating a return? In examining these questions, it is essential to consider the complexities of regional cooperation, state failure, and international intervention in the Sahel region...