The headquarter completion coincides with another suggestion that the subregion could get more attention from China in the next three years. Experts espouse that China has shown interest in expanding activities in western Africa, which has been aided in particular by Chinese investment channelled through the BRI. The West African subregion dominates Beijing’s port projects, totalling 35 in number—the highest number of Chinese port projects in Africa and any other subregion in the global community, attracting $6.533 billion of Chinese investment funds. These ports are a key product of China’s Go Out strategy, serving as connector routes that aid supply chains for the BRI. Beijing’s port development in western Africa provides funding for efficient infrastructure and provides an opportunity for these nations to increase their exports to China, which will be further enabled by Beijing’s recent zero-tariff policy on African countries. In line with discussions at the 2024 FOCAC summit, the ports could enable the transfer of technology and agricultural training programmes, which will be huge benefits to the agriculture-oriented West African economies, reducing food insecurity and agricultural unproductivity. Nevertheless, the initiative itself is indeed highly strategic for China. The southeast Asian country is harnessing West Africa’s 7,000 kilometres coastline to access the subregion’s natural resources, connecting it to the larger global supply chain—a strategy that has been overlooked by other external powers.

China is also hoping to use its West African seaports for military purposes. Some of these ports host joint military training and drills for China and West African nations. This could be an effort to protect its emerging port systems in the subregion, especially in the Gulf of Guinea, which is notoriously known for sea piracy and maritime insecurity. China’s interest in the Gulf is growing steadily due to its interests in oil exploration, but it has been impacted by maritime criminal activities. It will therefore be unsurprising to see Beijing spearheading counter-piracy operations, as, according to Paul Nantulya, a research associate at the Africa Centre for Strategic Studies, increased economic activities will attract sea pirates.

China’s preexisting activities in the West African region pair perfectly with its 2024 FOCAC strategy of increasing its focus on security and military cooperation for Africa through its Global Security Initiative. This includes the provision of counterterrorism resources and training for African security institutions and militaries to aid the fight against violent extremism. While many presume that this security interest is an avenue to protect its economic interests and secure Chinese nationals, Eric Olander, Co-Founder of The China Global South Project, emphasized during a remote interview with The Republic that ‘we cannot use the example or the model of what the United States (US) or the Europeans have done in Africa and apply that to the Chinese. The Chinese have a very, very different approach.’

China’s increasing relations with ECOWAS could be to the detriment of its failing relations with the junta-oriented Alliance of Sahel States (Alliance des États du Sahel—AES), consisting of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. While the ‘three horsemen of the central Sahel’ would have served as a good ground for testing China’s counterterrorism initiatives against the notorious Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin, Beijing’s ties with the subregional bloc are likely to discourage AES’s engagement with China. Recently, the ‘junta strategy of resource nationalism’ and the desire for these states to monitor their economic sovereignty could continue to limit China’s economic interest in West Africa, as seen in Niger.