Photo Illustration by Ezinne Osueke / THE REPUBLIC. Source Ref: WIKIMEDIA.
THE MINISTRY OF BUSINESS X THE ECONOMY
How America Determines Nigerian Fuel Prices
Photo Illustration by Ezinne Osueke / THE REPUBLIC. Source Ref: WIKIMEDIA
THE MINISTRY OF BUSINESS X THE ECONOMY
How America Determines Nigerian Fuel Prices
In global trade circles, American president Donald Trump administration’s renewed tariff campaign is being framed not merely as a revival of trade war tactics, reminiscent of the famous Richard Nixon shock of 1971, but as a diplomatic lever to recalibrate the global economic architecture. As in 1971, the tariffs are intended to bring counterparties to the negotiating table. However, where they differ is that Trump’s demands appear to go beyond currency revaluations—the hallmark of the Nixon shock—and instead pursue varied agendas depending on the counterparty.
For instance, in the case of the European Union, it is quite evident that the tariffs are a direct response to antitrust laws targeting American tech companies. During a May 2025 news conference addressing his new tariff policy, President Trump even asserted that the European Union is ‘nastier than China,’ citing EU antitrust actions against American tech firms as evidence of unfair trade practices.
As such, these tariffs are not just about traditional trade imbalances. They also concern digital taxes, maintaining capital account surpluses via deregulating antitrust enforcement, and the broader contest over control of the global tech narrative.
At the heart of it all lies an audacious move that could have lasting significance, similar to the Nixon shock. Yet, where Nixon abandoned the gold standard to preserve America’s monetary sovereignty, Trump is trying something arguably more complex. He wants to maintain the United States’ dominance in global capital markets while also reducing the trade deficit. The irony is that since the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1973, the US has run large trade deficits but offset them with capital account surpluses. In plain terms, the US buys more from the world than it sells, but the dollars it sends out come back into its economy as investments in US assets. This flow of global savings into US financial markets helped deepen Wall Street and gave rise to the dominance of American tech and finance.
In fact, this cycle was the genius of the Nixon shock. Foreign exporters earned dollars from trade with the US, then reinvested those dollars into US government bonds, stocks and technology firms. The US became a net importer of goods, but also a net exporter of financial assets and influence. What Trump appears to be attempting, as economist and former Greek finance minister, Yanis Varoufakis, has noted is to maintain the US’s capital account supremacy, rooted in its tech and financial services sectors, while simultaneously reducing its trade deficit through tariffs and industrial reshoring. In essence, it is an effort to sustain the post-Nixon model of dollar hegemony without the external imbalances that usually accompany it.
This is where Nigeria enters the frame. In a dollarized global economy, such moves never remain confined to US borders. For a country whose oil economy and import structure are both priced in dollars, the ripple effects of any shift in US trade or economic policy are immediate and structural. Tariffs, dollar strategy and capital flows form a single chain: from Washington’s policy room to the global commodities market, and finally to the Nigerian pump. It is this chain that binds Trump’s economic experiment to Nigeria’s oil dilemma.
While some economists have dismissed the possibility of this strategy succeeding—arguing that Trump’s fiscal expansion could fuel inflation, prompting the Federal Reserve (the US’s central bank) to raise interest rates and inadvertently strengthen the dollar—others remain more circumspect. Barry Eichengreen, a prominent economic historian, has emphasized that attempts to weaken the dollar through tariffs and fiscal measures may be counterproductive, as they could undermine financial stability and erode confidence in the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency. However, Varoufakis offers a more measured assessment as while acknowledging these contradictions, he argues that if successful, Trump’s strategy could be as revolutionary as the Nixon shock.
Where Nixon engineered a system that recycled trade deficits into capital inflows, Trump is attempting to maintain capital account dominance via tech and finance while simultaneously shrinking the trade deficit. If this recalibration holds, it may well mark a new chapter in the geopolitics of global finance. For countries like Nigeria, this isn’t just macro theory. A shift in US trade and currency policy doesn’t just affect Wall Street; it recalibrates the price of crude, the naira’s stability, and the balance of power in the downstream oil sector. The same capital account flows that Trump is trying to engineer feed directly into the foreign exchange (FX) market Nigeria depends on. Making Washington’s strategy and Nigeria’s petrol pumps part of the same story.
THE DOLLAR DILEMMA AND MANUFACTURED LEVERAGE
The Trump administration appears to be pursuing a subtle devaluation of the dollar, not through direct policy tools but via tariff imposition, capital account manipulation and strategic signals to markets. This approach has been framed most explicitly by US economic advisor Stephen Miran, who helped shape the Mar-a-Lago Accord, a policy framework aimed at weakening the dollar to boost exports and reduce the trade deficit, while incentivizing the return of American manufacturing. Similarly, former US trade representative Robert Lighthizer has argued that the dollar remains overvalued and that a weaker greenback would better support American industry. Even President Trump has long maintained that a strong dollar, while symbolically powerful, disadvantages US exports, asserting that a weaker currency would help ‘Make America Great Again’. These moves, while subtle, signal a clear intention to pressure trade partners, reconfigure global trade balances, and restructure America’s place in the international economic hierarchy.
The goal, as some analysts observe, is to pressure trade partners into revaluing their currencies, as Nixon once did with Japan, thereby boosting American export competitiveness without triggering a full-scale currency war. Reports from The Economist and economic think tanks such as the Brookings Institution and the Peterson Institute for International Economics echo this, suggesting the tariffs are being used not merely as protectionist measures, but as levers in a broader negotiation strategy aimed at recalibrating global exchange rates in favour of US interests.
Conventional economics suggests that fiscal loosening (such as tax cuts for the wealthy and increased public spending) stimulates domestic demand, fuels inflation, and prompts the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates. The Trump administration’s proposed policies, including extensions of the 2017 tax cuts and new relief measures for tips and overtime pay, are projected to cost at least $4.9 trillion over a decade, offset by proposed cuts to healthcare and social programmes. Yet these measures, rather than weakening the dollar, may strengthen it. Global demand for US treasuries sustains capital inflows, keeping the dollar buoyant.
As the Council on Foreign Relations notes, the dollar’s role as the world’s reserve currency allows the US to issue debt at lower costs. This makes a significant devaluation of the dollar unlikely and highlights contradictions in Trump’s economic strategy. Expansive fiscal policies tend to increase inflation, which in turn pressures interest rate hikes, further reinforcing the dollar. A 2022 Federal Reserve Board study notes that fiscal stimulus can raise consumption without boosting output, leading to excess demand and inflationary tension. So, can the US genuinely weaken its currency while flooding its economy with dollars? The markets may eventually call the bluff.
In Nigeria, the naira’s value is heavily tied to dollar liquidity and US fiscal and monetary policy cascades directly into Nigeria’s foreign exchange market. A stronger dollar amplifies the cost of servicing external debt and inflates the price of imports, particularly refined petroleum. A weaker dollar, conversely, may push up nominal oil prices but can also increase FX volatility in dollar-dependent economies.
shop the republic
AMERICAN INFLATION AS AN EXPORT COMMODITY
If Trump’s dollar strategy succeeds, or even if it simply generates volatility, the effects will not remain confined within US borders. Inflation created by American fiscal and trade policy radiates outward, shaping global prices and domestic realities far beyond Washington.
As the issuer of the global reserve currency, US inflation spills over through interconnected trade and financial systems, impacting import-dependent and dollar-exposed nations. The term ‘exporting inflation’, in this context, refers to the transmission of US-sourced inflationary pressures to other economies, especially those that are import-dependent or have high exposure to the dollar. This process unfolds through several interlinked channels, often blurring the line between domestic monetary decisions and global macroeconomic consequences.
The most direct mechanism is the dollar’s dominance in global trade. Commodities such as oil, gas, wheat and metals are priced in US dollars on international markets. Thus, when inflation in the US leads to a rise in commodity prices, countries that rely on these imports face higher costs, regardless of their own inflationary dynamics. This is especially acute in countries like Nigeria, where domestic production of essentials is low and imports account for a substantial portion of consumption. According to the Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), Nigeria’s highest imports in 2023 were refined petroleum ($18.2 billion), military vehicles ($9.17 billion), wheat ($2.97 billion), cars ($1.56billion) and raw sugar ($747 million)—all of which are susceptible to dollar-denominated price increases. Indeed, in an April 2025 interview with Arise News, economist, Paul Alaje, warned of Nigeria’s susceptibility to heightened US inflation.
A second mechanism for exporting inflation is currency depreciation caused by inflationary policy. When the US engages in expansive fiscal or monetary policies, such as large-scale tax cuts or quantitative easing, without an equivalent increase in productivity, the dollar may weaken. While a weaker dollar can help boost US exports by making them cheaper, it can wreak havoc elsewhere. For economies that hold reserves or transact heavily in dollars, the depreciation effectively raises the price of imports and increases the local currency cost of servicing dollar-denominated debt.
For instance, in 1985, the US dollar had appreciated significantly, leading to trade imbalances and economic strain on other countries. To address this, the United States and other major economies entered into the Plaza Accord, an agreement aimed at depreciating the US dollar through coordinated intervention in currency markets. This deliberate weakening of the dollar was intended to correct trade imbalances but also had significant impacts on countries holding dollar-denominated assets or debts. For example, Mexico, already burdened with large volumes of dollar-denominated debt, was hit hard when the dollar’s devaluation caused the real value of its debt to rise sharply in local currency terms. The peso depreciated by over 40 per cent during this period, triggering a debt repayment crisis and contributing to broader regional instability. The Plaza Accord thus stands as an early case study of how US-engineered currency shifts can transmit financial shocks to dollar-dependent economies, a dynamic still playing out today in Nigeria.
Lastly, interest rate and capital flow dynamics play a crucial role. Inflationary pressures often push interest rate hikes, which attract global capital into the US, causing a reversal of capital flows from emerging markets like Nigeria. The resulting outflows weaken other currencies, further elevating import prices and domestic inflation. This cycle can force developing countries to raise their own rates to stem currency depreciation, tightening domestic financial conditions and slowing growth. In early 2024, for example, following US interest rate hikes, Nigeria raised its benchmark interest rate by 400 basis points to 22.75 per cent, the largest increase in 17 years, to counter capital outflows and stabilize the naira.
Today, Nigeria remains deeply exposed to this phenomenon. Despite recent efforts to increase local refining capacity and diversify its economy, Nigeria still imports a significant bulk of its refined petroleum (about 25 million litres daily) and is highly dollar-dependent. Any uptick in US inflation, particularly if driven by proposed tax cuts and increased fiscal spending, could trigger global inflationary trends. As oil and other key goods are priced in dollars, US inflation feeds into higher benchmark prices on global exchanges, regardless of Nigeria’s domestic production or currency dynamics.
Moreover, Nigeria’s capacity to shield itself is limited. With inflation already elevated and interest rates near record highs, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has little room for further monetary tightening. The CBN, in its February 2025 communiqué, noted the ‘persistent volatility in the foreign exchange market’ and the challenge of ‘high inflationary pressures,’ underscoring the domestic vulnerability to global shocks. Similarly, Agora Policy, an Abuja-based economic think tank, warned in its February 2025 report, ‘How the Impending Trade Wars May Impact Nigeria’, that ‘Nigeria is at risk of low foreign exchange inflows and higher inflation due to recent economic policies of the United States.’ A resurgence in US inflation, especially if it triggers another interest rate hike, could further weaken the naira, intensify capital flight, and raise the cost of living for ordinary Nigerians.
shop the republic
IS THE OIL ECONOMY CAUGHT IN CROSSFIRE?
Nigeria’s oil economy is where US tariff policy and domestic market dynamics converge. As both crude oil exports and refined product imports are priced in dollars, any movement in US trade and currency strategy cascades directly into Nigeria’s pump prices. A weaker dollar can inflate nominal oil prices on global markets. Thus, tighter US monetary policy can squeeze Nigeria’s FX reserves and affect the naira’s strength.
Against this backdrop, Nigeria’s fuel market is entering uncertain terrain. Until recently, the Nigerian National Petroleum Company (NNPC) was the default price-setter for refined petrol. Yet, in a striking turn, current pump prices suggest a reversal. Dangote-affiliated outlets are now undercutting NNPC prices, with petrol reportedly selling at ₦825 per litre compared to NNPC’s ₦910. This is not just a local story of market competition; it shows how global financial currents are refracted through Nigeria’s new refining landscape.
This inversion raises a series of pressing questions. Is Dangote, now increasingly dominant in the supply chain, quietly asserting pricing power in anticipation of NNPC’s limited long-term supply capacity? And if so, is the market experiencing a structural shift—one where private refineries begin shaping national energy economics? A March 2025 article in the Financial Times, titled ‘How Nigeria’s Dangote Refinery is Fuelling a Petrol Price War’, directly makes this case, pointing to Dangote’s price undercutting as a sign of emerging market dominance and a new phase of domestic price-setting dynamics.
Further complicating this picture are broader macroeconomic dynamics. Conventional wisdom holds that a weaker dollar typically inflates the nominal price of oil, raising import costs for countries like Nigeria. Yet, if Dangote continues to cut prices even in the face of a depreciating naira and volatile Brent prices, does that logic still hold? Or are domestic price trends now more a function of supply-side repositioning than global financial spillovers? In this context, geopolitical events and US fiscal policy may still shape energy costs, but perhaps less directly than before, and more importantly, the magnitude may impact Dangote less than NNPC. The real question may not be whether Nigeria’s fuel economy is caught in global crossfire, but rather, if it’s now entering a new era of domestic price warfare.
The removal of fuel subsidies, once justified as an economic necessity to curb fiscal bleeding, reportedly costing Nigeria over ₦4 trillion annually, was also presented by the government as a step toward transparency and market efficiency. However, in hindsight, one can argue that this policy shift effectively relinquished the government’s leverage in price negotiations. Without subsidies, the state can no longer instruct NNPC to maintain artificially low prices without absorbing the fiscal cost. In a deregulated environment, pricing decisions are now influenced by market forces, which are increasingly embodied in Dangote’s operations.
Dangote’s refinery, reportedly Africa’s largest, benefits from scale and a seemingly different orientation toward short-term profit. Unlike NNPC, which remains tied to political and fiscal considerations, Dangote has greater flexibility in pricing strategy, distribution efficiency and cost control. Its ability to undercut NNPC, if sustained, may not be about immediate profit but long-term dominance. If state subsidies do not return, and NNPC continues to struggle with FX losses and internal inefficiencies, Dangote could emerge as the de facto price-setter, effectively pricing NNPC out of urban markets and relegating its downstream services to strategic rural supply or emergency reserves.
This transition raises critical questions about Nigeria’s energy sovereignty and the balance of power in its fuel economy. The shift from a state-led to a privately dominated fuel market, without robust competitive structures, may, in the long term, empower a private monopoly rather than establish a free market. The implications for accountability, national pricing strategy and the average Nigerian consumer are profound and warrant careful consideration.
shop the republic
-
‘Make the World Burn Again’ by Edel Rodriguez by Edel Rodriguez
₦70,000.00 – ₦75,000.00Price range: ₦70,000.00 through ₦75,000.00 This product has multiple variants. The options may be chosen on the product page -
‘Nigerian Theatre’ Print by Shalom Ojo
₦150,000.00 -
‘Natural Synthesis’ Print by Diana Ejaita
₦70,000.00 – ₦75,000.00Price range: ₦70,000.00 through ₦75,000.00 This product has multiple variants. The options may be chosen on the product page -
‘Homecoming’ Print by Shalom Ojo
₦70,000.00 – ₦75,000.00Price range: ₦70,000.00 through ₦75,000.00 This product has multiple variants. The options may be chosen on the product page
THE REBRANDED DEPENDENCY: MONOPOLY IN THE AGE OF REFORM
The turn toward local refining may appear as a strategic buffer against global volatility, particularly in light of shifting US energy priorities and a broader Western push against fuel subsidy regimes. However, Nigeria’s emerging dependency on a single dominant actor like the Dangote refinery may be a cause for concern. Despite the domestic location of refining activities, the dollar-indexed nature of key inputs, such as crude oil, means that the pricing mechanism remains tethered to global markets and the United States’ monetary policy. In this sense, the tariff-driven attempt to manage the dollar and capital flows in Washington feeds directly into Nigeria’s cost structure, making US trade policy an indirect participant in its domestic fuel economy.
The current US policy of dollar tightening has already created significant liquidity pressures across emerging markets, further exposing Nigeria’s naira to depreciation and imported inflation. In this context, the influence of US institutions, directly via policy shifts and indirectly through multilateral institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, becomes apparent. Indeed, despite the absence of active IMF loans, the institution’s influence persists, not through direct conditionalities, but through policy surveillance, technical assistance, and the normative frameworks they promote. The IMF’s recommendations in its Article IV consultations continue to shape domestic reform agendas, especially regarding fuel subsidy removal and market liberalization, often under the guise of enhancing fiscal discipline and investor confidence. For instance, the IMF’s 2025 Article IV mission to Nigeria highlighted the cessation of central bank financing of the fiscal deficit and the removal of costly fuel subsidies as significant steps taken by Nigerian authorities to stabilize the economy and enhance resilience.
These recommendations align with the IMF’s broader agenda of promoting fiscal discipline and market liberalization. Yet in practice, such externally endorsed reforms have frequently translated into regressive cost burdens for citizens, particularly within structurally unequal economies like Nigeria’s. Critics, including the IMF itself, in its 2024 Article IV Consultation with Nigeria acknowledged the challenges posed by fuel subsidy removal, exchange rate depreciation and poor agricultural production, noting that headline inflation reached 27 per cent year-on-year in October 2023, with food inflation at 32 per cent.
Ultimately, fuel subsidy removal led to severe economic consequences, including tripled fuel prices, escalating inflation and further devaluation of the naira, which disproportionately impacted the poor. The abrupt elimination of subsidies, as noted in the Financial Times, resulted in heightened economic turmoil, calling into question the adequacy of the IMF’s recommendations, particularly in terms of protective measures for vulnerable citizens. These domestic shocks unfolded against the backdrop of tightening US dollar liquidity and tariff-induced capital realignments, amplifying the pressure on Nigeria’s already strained FX market.
Thus, Nigeria’s fuel sector’s prospective transition, from indirect state monopoly (NNPC) to private dominance is therefore not simply a technocratic adjustment but a political realignment. It risks replicating, even deepening, the inequitable outcomes of the previous regime, especially if pricing and access are determined by opaque negotiations between corporate elites and the state. Without robust regulatory oversight or competition policy, citizens may find themselves caught between global macroeconomic volatility and domestic corporate monopoly. In this light, Nigeria’s fuel economy is not just responding to internal reforms but to the external shocks generated by US tariffs, dollar policy, and capital flows.
What is framed as a step toward energy sovereignty may thus amount to a rebranding of dependency, where Washington’s economic experiment and Abuja’s refinery politics converge at the Nigerian pump. In effect, tightening dollar flows, alongside other policy decisions like the seeming global retreat from fuel subsidies and push for decarbonisation continue to ripple through Nigeria’s political economy. The danger is that liberalization, in this configuration, becomes less about fostering market efficiency and more about reallocating rents within a narrower elite circle, thereby further marginalizing the majority⎈
shop the republic
BUY THE MAGAZINE AND/OR THE COVER
-
‘Make the World Burn Again’ by Edel Rodriguez by Edel Rodriguez
₦70,000.00 – ₦75,000.00Price range: ₦70,000.00 through ₦75,000.00 This product has multiple variants. The options may be chosen on the product page -
The Republic V9, N2 Who Dey Fear Donald Trump? / Africa In The Era Of Multipolarity
₦20,000.00