Tinubu’s Russian Roulette
The hoisting of Russian flags in Nigeria during recent protests suggests how President Tinubu’s ECOWAS foreign policy gambles might have triggered pro-Russian sentiments in Nigeria.
In Nigeria’s policy landscape, there is an ongoing assumption that President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s foreign policy is a gamble; that Tinubu’s foreign policy approach might have triggered pro-Russian sentiments in Nigeria; and that it has not only been reciprocated but has also been done by Nigeriens. But all these assumptions reflect half-truths which are explicated here, along with the unbelievable-but-true statements.
To begin with the unbelievable truths: there is no Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) foreign policy peculiar to Tinubu that is different from that of the various regimes or administrations Nigeria has had. Nigeria’s foreign policies of ‘no compromise with apartheid’ and the non-acceptance of the exclusive use of Africa’s mineral resources for the development of Europe and America were rationales for the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, developed and adopted by Dr Jaja Wachukwu, the then minister of external affairs, and Dr Okoi Arikpo, commissioner for external affairs, respectively. These viewpoints gathered momentum in 1972, with the consideration of Africa as the cornerstone of Nigeria’s foreign policy—and later the ‘centrepiece’ in 1976—serving as a catalyst in the process. Tinubu’s predecessors in government, despite the planks in their own eyes, behaved like the ‘enforcers of justice’ in Africa in the spirit of a self-ascribed ‘Giant of Africa.’ Tinubu’s policy attitude is no different.
Secondly, it is quite difficult to differentiate between Tinubu’s foreign policy as president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and Tinubu’s foreign policy as chairperson of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State. For instance, Niger-Nigeria bilateral ties are quite warm. When compared with the other neighbours of Nigeria, it is the only bilateral relationship devoid of any long-lasting international border dispute. In spite of ECOWAS’ military threat to compel the Abdourahamane Tchiani-led junta to release the ousted President Mohamed Bazoum, Niger-Nigeria military ties have not been terribly affected.
Nigeria’s chief of defence staff, General Christopher Musa, led a delegation to his Nigerien counterpart, General Moussa Salaou Barmou, in August 2024. This was possible because it is the same ethnic community of people that live on both sides of the Niger-Nigeria international border, which, at best, is porous. It is therefore difficult to argue here—on the basis of this relationship and the reason for the visit—that there has been foreign policy gambling. If there has been any gambling at all, it can only exist at the level of the ECOWAS policy attitude towards Niger.
Thirdly, the assumption that Tinubu’s foreign policy might have triggered pro-Russian sentiments in Nigeria cannot but be true. However, it is not the president’s foreign policy that has triggered the pro-Russian sentiments per se, but the seven-day ultimatum ECOWAS gave to the Republic of Niger. Nigeria took some sanctions against Niger because of the May 2024 coup ousting President Mohamed Bazoum—like cutting off electricity supply, which falls within the Niger-Nigerian bilateral commission framework for cooperation. Although one can argue that the measure was Nigerian in design and implementation, Nigeria actually acted in compliance with the supranational directives of the ECOWAS Authority but carelessly ignored the contractual obligations it had agreed to with Niger. Nevertheless, one could still argue that Tinubu engaged in political gambling with this decision...
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