In the run-up to the election, a sombre reminder of the whittled influence that Faki Mahamat had as AU commission chair was his removal from a closed-door joint session of SADC and EAC discussing the escalation of conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo. As the media followed the clashes in Goma and the terse exchanges between South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Rwandan President Paul Kagame, the voice and opinion of the AU’s most senior diplomat was absent and not actively sought. A meeting of the AU Peace and Security Council was not as followed as the regional meetings of the blocs concerned and attempts to manage the clash. This was especially telling—the AU was not seen to drive the resolution-making process for a truly cross-regional issue.

Youssouf might find himself in a similar position if some existential questions are not addressed. First, do AU member states want a powerful and impact organization or one that does not rival or challenge domestic sovereignty? This question is as old as pan-Africanism itself, with questions around the extent countries are prepared to cede control. It is also not unique to Africa, with this being at the heart of the Brexit referendum as the United Kingdom evidently struggled with ‘an ever-closer Union’.

This question comes across in the governance mechanism, which defers mostly to heads of state as the highest decision-making body. The head is the actual chair of the AU, a role that Angola’s João Lourenço has recently assumed. At its best, there is effective collaboration between both groups, priorities are agreed upon, and the chair is an active voice of the commission’s priorities for the coming year. At its worst, it is simply a vehicle for the chair to exert his foreign policy ambitions, and he continues to restrict the commission as a result. This is also manifest in the way leaders are elected. Compromise instances are allowing the commission chair to appoint a cabinet with consideration for regional and gender balance, as the UN secretary-general does, or allowing member states to nominate commissioners that the commission chair then allocates portfolios to, as the EU Commission president does. In each case, the appointer is aware that they have the ability to either dismiss or request a reassignment of the officeholder, and they hold accountability for their actions. But it is not the case at the AU, where a poorly performing commissioner is safe in the realization that they were similarly elected as the chairperson was. It can also mean that a chairperson’s vision for their term in office is largely restricted to their ‘good offices’ and their ability to work with a commission that they manage but is not strictly accountable to them.

A second question is if AU member states know how they want the relationship between the continental body and the regional economic communities to unfold. One of the more effective reform recommendations was replacing one of the AU’s biannual summits with a coordination meeting between these regional bodies. Faki’s approach to governance in recent years appears to have been ceding direction for resolving issues to the regional bodies. Coups in Niger and Gabon was largely handled by ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States respectively. Likewise, the decision of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger to leave ECOWAS and form the Alliance of Sahel States has been largely managed by the bloc. But there is a clear advantage in having a continental body actively involved in helping to coordinate resolutions. The reality is that there are seldom any isolated issues that don’t affect multiple member states and regions. Yet each bloc has a rotating head of state in charge, an administrative leader and different regional initiatives and projects. It does not seem that this complex cavalcade for country chess is designed to ensure clarity on purpose and direction, especially as there is no guidance on which topics are AU-specific and which are to be handled by the bloc.

This will no doubt interact with how hegemons want, or are prepared, to engage with the AU. For added context, we can almost compare this situation with the limitations to the capacity of the UN imposed by the need to reconcile with the interests of the permanent five member states of the UN Security Council. If these states have their relative ‘fiefdoms’ in tow, and if other countries that might not be presently in a key position at Addis Ababa can feel more at ease among the smaller numbers in Gaborone or Abuja, what does that mean for their engagement with the continental body? These questions are also present in member states, especially when dealing with devolved authorities and the functionality of subnational units. But there are clear constitutional prerogatives and powers for central or state bodies, something that does not apply in a diplomatic context. The new commission will have to find a quick solution to what role the AU plays in managing regional dynamics.