Have Nigerian Governors Lost Their Powers?

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June/July 2025Nigeria
Governor

Photo Illustration by Ezinne Osueke / THE REPUBLIC. Source Ref: WIKIMEDIA.

THE MINISTRY OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Have Nigerian Governors Lost Their Powers?

In the wake of political defections by Nigerian governors, there are questions about their influence and how much of these defections significantly affect the country’s political trajectory.
Governor

Photo Illustration by Ezinne Osueke / THE REPUBLIC. Source Ref: WIKIMEDIA.

THE MINISTRY OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Have Nigerian Governors Lost Their Powers?

In the wake of political defections by Nigerian governors, there are questions about their influence and how much of these defections significantly affect the country’s political trajectory.

Nigeria’s most influential political figures are arguably its governors. Every elected president since 1999 has either been a former military head of state or a former governor. Three of the four frontrunners in the 2023 presidential election (Bola Tinubu, Peter Obi and Rabiu Kwankwaso) were former two-term governors, and the fourth (Atiku Abubakar) was elected governor but left office before the end of his term to become vice president. Governors have also become influential as party chairs; every elected or appointed chair of Nigeria’s ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) was a governor. They have played key roles in seminal moments in Nigerian history, such as the doctrine of necessity that elevated Goodluck Jonathan to the acting presidency, pushing back against the naira redesign change, and engaging with the proposed tax reform. Not all these positions are popular or necessarily ‘for the greater good’, but their impact shows this class of citizens’ importance. For better or worse, few groups are as influential and integral to political outcomes as governors.

Governors are also influential because of the expectation that their movement often ‘flips’ a state. On 23 April 2025, Delta State Governor Sheriff Oborevwori defected from the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) to the APC. He did so with a retinue of prominent state officials, including his predecessor and PDP’s 2023 vice-presidential nominee, Ifeanyi Okowa, who has since acknowledged a strong aversion to another northern president succeeding Muhammadu Buhari. Subsequent defections by Delta State federal lawmakers have suddenly put a state that had voted for PDP’s presidential nominee in all but one presidential election into APC’s column. The status of governors as party leaders in the state has often led to a sense that courting them is all that is needed for a party’s fortunes.

But the seeming inevitability of a powerful governor appears to be on the wane. Different policies and procedures appeared geared towards checking the strength of this unique class of citizens. Former officeholders in more federal positions are using their experiences to inform how they manage power at the expense of their successors. Increased political awareness, active political stakeholders, and general scrutiny mean that the political careerist’s dream of serving in the national legislature, then two terms as governor before becoming president, might be blocked for future generations. If governors are increasingly checked, it could open the door to a new, uncertain era of Nigerian politics.

SAME OLD STORY, JUST A DIFFERENT PARTY

Delta State is only the latest instance of a governor defecting, often with a coterie of aides, national legislators, state representatives and other key politicians from their states. When they have moved or acted as a bloc, they have changed electoral outcomes; the G5 states in 2014 included Nigeria’s second (Kano) and third (Rivers) most populous states and put paid to the PDP’s presidential ambitions in the 2015 elections. Again, in 2022, the new G5 also defeated their party’s presidential prospects—PDP lost in all five states, including four that it had always carried in presidential elections till 2023. Since the return to democracy in 1999, 21 governors, representing close to half of Nigeria’s 36 states, have defected to join other political parties. Despite the implications of this trend to democratic governance, it has remained a part of the culture.

The first recorded instance of defection in Nigerian politics took place in 1951, when 20 members of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons moved to the Action Group in a bid to stall the emergence of Nnamdi Azikiwe as the Western region’s premier. Politicians have since utilized defection to remain relevant or ensure proximity to power. Although measures are in place to monitor political parties’ activities in Nigeria, they are not effectively enforced, reinforcing the issue. A notable instance in the Second Republic (1979 – 83) was Kano State Governor Abubakar Rimi’s defection from the People’s Redemption Party (PRP) to the Nigerian People’s Party in 1983 following internal disputes. This move, however, did not secure his re-election; Sabo Bakin Zuwo of the PRP defeated him in the subsequent election.

This issue has escalated in the Fourth Republic, where 15 states across five of six geopolitical zones have seen a governor defect mid-term. The first recorded instances, just before the third elections of a new democratic dispensation, in 2007, took place in Imo, Jigawa and Sokoto for a variety of reasons. All three defected to run for different positions in the next elections. The governors of Imo and Jigawa defected to PDP because of their political ambitions¾Ibrahim Saminu Turaki wanted to contest a senate seat in Jigawa, while Ihedi Ohakim was seeking a second term as governor of Imo after clashing with his mentor and party leader, Orji Uzor Kalu. Sokoto’s Attahiru Bafarawa left the All Nigeria’s Peoples Party (ANPP) to contest the presidency on the platform of another party.

Some states have seen a higher incidence rate than others. The most notable defections, three in total, have taken place in Sokoto, with Aminu Waziri Tambuwal also seeking the presidency in 2019 and Aliyu Wammako moving as part of the G5 merger into the APC. Other states have recorded two instances: Abia, Adamawa, Imo, Kwara and Zamfara. Most of them involve multiple governors, while Kwara is represented twice by Abdulfatah Ahmed, who left to join APC in 2015 and returned to PDP ahead of the 2019 general elections.

Defections ask several questions of the political landscapes in these areas. For instance, the Southwest is the only geopolitical zone without a case of defection by a sitting governor. But this can be tied to two factors. Firstly, it is the zone with the most off-cycle elections, lending more confidence to the sentiment that court processes can lead to the removal of an unpopular governor. Elections in Ekiti, Ondo, and Osun now occur outside of the general election year, and these elections have seen instances of the ruling party losing. Secondly, the zone has also seen voters actively embrace ‘skirt-and-blouse voting’, where the electorate chooses different parties for the various elective seats. This might have diminished the sense that governors play a significant role in shaping electoral outcomes in the zone.

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A METHOD TO THE MADNESS

Another question that defections ask is if there is actually a way to determine if there are repeatedly cited instances or reasons behind the different defections. They appear to fall under two broad categories—election bids and evolving party dynamics.

Individual ambition involves cases where a governor often defects to seek another elected office. Cases include Abia’s Kalu in 2007, seeking the presidency; Bauchi’s Isa Yuguda in 2009 to seek a second term; Benue’s Samuel Ortom in 2018 to seek a second term; Ebonyi’s Dave Umahi in 2020 to contest for president; Edo’s Godwin Obaseki in 2021 to seek a second term; Imo’s Rochas Okorocha, in 2014, to contest for president in 2015; Jigawa’s Turaki, in 2005, seeking a senate seat; Sokoto’s Attahiru Bafarawa in 2006 and Aminu Tambuwal in 2018 to contest for president, and Zamfara’s Mahmud Shinkafi, in 2008, and Bello Matawalle in 2021 in their ultimately unsuccessful bids for re-election.

The second most cited case involves party dynamics and governors adapting to party issues. The easiest example involves the G5 PDP governors ahead of the 2015 elections—Adamawa’s Murtala Nyako, Kano’s Rabiu Kwankwaso, Kwara’s Abdulfatah Ahmed, Rivers’s Rotimi Amaechi and Sokoto’s Aliyu Wammako—who moved as part of a factional split. However, party dynamics are not solely tied to defections, as they also encompass challenges to prominent party figures or issues with internal party structures. It is why instances also include Kebbi’s Adamu Aliero, who defected in 2007 as part of a factional split in ANPP and to support Umaru Yar’Adua’s 2007 bid for president. Other examples also include Abia’s Theodore Orji, who defected in 2013 owing to clashes with his predecessor, Kalu; Adamawa’s Boni Haruna, who defected in 2007, as a result of his mentor Atiku Abubakar leaving PDP; Cross River’s Ben Ayade, who defected in 2021, after reportedly losing control of the state’s party structure; Imo’s Ikedi Ohakim, who defected in 2008 after similarly clashing with his party’s leader Kalu; and Kwara’s Abdulfatah Ahmed whose return to PDP in 2018 aligned mainly with the return of his predecessor, Bukola Saraki.

None of these reasons is isolated, with many reasons often overlapping. Party dynamics may have triggered Kwankwaso’s defection in 2014, but it was certainly driven by calculations for an eventual presidential bid. Similarly, Obaseki’s move in 2021 was as a result of losing APC’s ticket to seek re-election but also involved falling out with his predecessor and reported godfather, Adams Oshiomhole.

There is also an argument for creating a third categorization that focuses strictly on instances where governors defected as a result of instances affecting their political mentors or ‘godfathers’. In this case, we can pair Orji and Ohakim against Kalu, Ortom against Akume, and Obaseki against Oshiomhole, while also including Haruna with Atiku and Ahmed with Saraki. But most of these instances fell within questions of internal party structures – if governors felt in control, they would be less likely to feel the need to depart while in office.

At the height of its power, PDP controlled governorship mansions in 28 states and the presidency. It appeared then that it was easier to join the ruling party and to enjoy the benefits of incumbency than to challenge an inevitable defeat. However, the eventual merger that produced APC, along with the strong showing of third force parties in flipping Abia and Kano’s governorship houses, could be a sign that federal might is not the sole arbiter in determining electoral outcomes. There are also cases where defections might have a limited scope of influence.

Most of the recorded cases can be attributed to politicians acknowledging the challenging reality of prospects and deciding to find alternative ways to achieve their dreams. However, in most cases, these moves did not yield significant dividends. While Yuguda, Ortom and Obaseki eventually won their re-election bids, the vast majority of the defectors above did not win the elections they were bidding for, with Tambuwal and Okorocha eventually needing to pivot to governorship re-election bids after losing the presidential primaries.

Even the oft-cited effect of governors flipping states has not been as strong an argument as has been made in the past. Obaseki was unable to win either the 2023 presidential election or the 2024 governorship election for the PDP, losing to both Labour and the APC, respectively. Shinkafi also witnessed the PDP lose both the presidential and governorship elections in 2011 after he defected, and Haruna’s defection did not halt the PDP’s popularity or victories in Adamawa. Ayade, Okorocha, Matawalle, Tambuwal, Umahi and Yuguda were able to win either the presidential or governorship vote for their states, but lost the other, with Matawalle notably losing re-election. The G5 governors recorded a more successful rate; four of the five governors delivered both the presidential and governorship votes for the APC. Still, Buhari had carried three of these states before, and they also had a track record of backing anti-PDP governors in previous elections. The only flip would prove to Kwara, and Abdulfatah’s defection four years later did not change the presidential or governorship outcome.

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A DEFECTED SYSTEM?

This raises the question of the rationale and justification for defection by any governor. After all, most governors are impactful during their maximum possible two terms and only maintain influence if they are able to impose a preferred successor. In most cases, governors who have defected have either sought to engage in federal politics and deal with federal-related contests or sought other responsibilities to manage, eventually leaving their successors to become influential.

For most governors, the ideal outcome has been serving two terms, gaining a Senate seat and ensuring the election of a loyal successor. But the governorship is a poisoned chalice for several reasons. First, elective politics operates under a ‘up or out’ system. It means that most term-limited governors either seek the presidency or a Senate seat as an alternative retirement option. This assumes that as each governor emerges, there will be others ambitious enough to establish their fiefdoms to launch their campaigns. This weakens several former governors without firm party structures. Second, the increasing number of elected officials means there are enough contenders establishing power bases. A two-term governor is unlikely to unseat a long-term member of the national assembly, especially one in the chamber’s leadership. It raises the possibility of governors having to contend with their predecessors, as well as national and state legislators, all vying for influence and jockeying for power.

Another blow to the existing structure appears to be recent reforms aimed at strengthening Nigeria’s local governments. With the July 2024 Supreme Court ruling ensuring that the third tier of government now receives its federal allocations directly from the centre, the firm grip that state governors have had on local government management could be loosened. Ambitious chairs may be able to leverage this to develop prospective pathways to challenge governors, while also creating another category of stakeholders with resources in state governance. This will further complicate the process by which state governors are expected to determine elections and govern territories.

Finally, the establishment of development commissions to cover every geopolitical zone will further enable the federal government to direct and influence development and funding interventions in states. With most states barely able to function with current government funding allocations and seeing increasing strains on their budgets, these development commissions will become new stakeholders in checking and engaging with states, with priorities that might be at odds with those of the federal government. The federal nature of these appointments and their oversight will also give more influence to elected federal legislators, who do not have term limits and could use this to accrue more influence in directing projects and funds to their states. The outcome is a new crop of officials that citizens, and ultimately politicians, will seek to address their issues and concerns.

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IS THIS THE PEAK OF THE GOVERNORSHIP?

With every election conducted, to varying degrees of accepted legitimacy, Nigeria drifts further from the era of military putsches and the entrenchment of an imperfect but present democracy. It also creates more ways to correct imbalances prevalent in political calculations. For starters, we’ve seen the myth of viewing different demographics as ‘monoliths’, when other important factors should include varied lived experiences. The question is whether, after 25 years, the power and influence of the Nigerian governorship have reached their peak.

In a sense, it was always inevitable that it would happen at some point. In a system that elevates individuals over parties, the more predecessors a governor has to deal with, the weaker they are likely to become. Similarly, the more former governors enter positions of authority, the more likely they are to know exactly how to oversee their successors. It is no coincidence that this question is coming under an administration with the most representation of former governors at its highest levels. President Bola Tinubu (Lagos), Vice-President Kashim Shettima (Borno), Senate President Godswill Akpabio (Akwa Ibom) and Secretary to the Government of the Federation George Akume (Benue) are all two-term former governors, along with two members of cabinet. Tinubu and his team were better placed to understand the need to check governors. Buhari’s administration benefited from a fairly indifferent posture from the president, alongside a new crop of first-term governors who were less experienced and less influential. But even at that, Buhari’s preferred successor was reportedly shot down by northern APC governors, who insisted on the ticket going south. His signature electoral policy, the redesign of the naira, was similarly blocked, and his administration was taken to court by governors of his own party. Even Buhari was not above being checked by the governors.

The last stand for governors in terms of managing influence remains within their respective political party structures. From controlling party delegates to bankrolling election campaigns and party administration, their ability to control parties will likely be the last stand for any attempt to whittle their influence. Political parties in Nigeria may have numbers, but an erratic rate of party dues and fundraising capabilities means that parties are beholden to their elected officials, who often provide financial support. State governors have access to most funds. If this is to change, it will require a concerted effort from other stakeholders to fill in the gap. It would also require stronger accountability measures to prevent governors from not utilising their state-allocated funds for the people. Neither is likely to occur soon, thereby delaying a firm transition. However, it would be unwise to discount a change in either direction.

The last question is whether this is good for Nigeria’s democracy. For so long, the governors’ class has been seen as a representation of Nigeria’s democratic challenges; a closed-off, patronage politics-driven group of practitioners who are predominantly men. The sentiment has been that this group has acted as the most influential lobbying group in the country, solely looking out for and considering its constituency of 36. A potential fall from grace might be seen by many as fair comeuppance, and the way citizens have gleefully jumped on clashes between predecessors and successors in recent years is a testament to the unpopularity of the cohort. But if a gap is created, something needs to fill it. Governors can be a well-utilized element of Nigeria’s democracy if they are held accountable and allowed to drive and push for state development actively. They can also work on really presenting the dividends of democracy to citizens who are far removed and might never even make the trip to Abuja. In essence, if governors were to be dethroned as the political force that they are, something would need to replace them. The question is whether this would be a radical change or more of the same⎈

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