Restrategizing Northern Nigerian Security Beyond Border Fences

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June/July 2025Nigeria
Security

Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Musa. Photo illustration by Dami Mojid / THE REPUBLIC.

THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY

Restrategizing Northern Nigerian Security Beyond Border Fences

Nigeria’s worsening insecurity cannot be curtailed by border fences alone, as suggested by the chief of defence staff, but by the government investing in border communities, strengthening local infrastructure and deepening cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries.
Security

Chief of Defence Staff, General Christopher Musa. Photo illustration by Dami Mojid / THE REPUBLIC.

THE MINISTRY OF SECURITY

Restrategizing Northern Nigerian Security Beyond Border Fences

Nigeria’s worsening insecurity cannot be curtailed by border fences alone, as suggested by the chief of defence staff, but by the government investing in border communities, strengthening local infrastructure and deepening cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries.

On Tuesday, 3 June 2025, Nigeria’s chief of defence staff, General Chris Musa, proposed the construction of fences around Nigeria’s borders at a border security conference in Abuja as an urgent measure in tackling insecurity and as a strategic step in the fight against terrorism. The defence chief called on the federal government to construct fences along all national borders, an urgent and strategic step in the fight against terrorism. This proposal from the defence chief comes as Nigeria intensifies its unending battle with networks of terrorist and insurgent groups intensifies who usually leverage Nigeria’s porous and unmanned border areas for cross-border crimes in the Sahel region. Musa said:

Border management is very critical. I have heard countries who had to fence their borders because of the level of insecurity they had. I know sometimes when you mention it people say, ‘no it is impossible.’ Pakistan fenced its 1,350 kilometres border with Afghanistan, which was the only time they had peace. Saudi Arabia and Iraq… 1,400 kilometres fenced completely can we start thinking of fencing our borders? We have 1,500 kilometres with Niger Republic, 1,900 kilometres with Cameroon, Chad is there, all over us surrounded by Francophone countries and the Sahel is heating up. If we do not do anything, when the Sahel falls it is Nigeria that everybody is interested in because they believe Nigeria is huge, Nigeria is big, Nigeria is rich and that is what we should start thinking about, how do we secure fully and take control of our borders? It is critical for our survival; it is critical for our sovereignty.

With over 135 borders in northern Nigeria unprotected out of the 261 approved borders, Nigeria remains vulnerable to cross-border threats and armed groups operating from neighbouring countries. If paired with proper surveillance and cooperation with border communities, this initiative could significantly reduce the proliferation of weapons, insurgents and criminal networks into the country. Though unprotected borders have contributed largely to cross-border and transnational crimes, there have been cases of collusion with security personnel in the smuggling of arms. In January 2025, Cameroon’s military intercepted a significant cache of weapons intended for Nigeria-based Boko Haram militants in Maroua, a northern town near the border shared by Cameroon, Nigeria, and Chad. According to officials, the haul included long-barrelled firearms, over 400 packets of tear gas, more than 100 gallons of oxidising agents used for making explosives, and military uniforms. A comprehensive multifaceted approach, including regional diplomacy, tactical intelligence with a regional task force and the use of up-to-date technology as well as strong prevention and enforcement mechanisms, will help improve security in Nigeria’s Northern borders.

While fencing of the border areas is a laudable idea, it is not enough and adequate in curbing insecurity, as modern warfare has gone beyond physical combat. The Nigerian Armed Forces must upgrade its technology for surveillance and deploy drones or unmanned aerial surveillance to monitor, track and eliminate targets. Also, border fencing as proposed by the defence chief, will not be wholly received by the border communities in Northern Nigeria, as most natives will view the demarcating walls as a restriction to the seeming affinity, socio-cultural and historical ties with their natives across the border in the North.

The proposal for building demarcating border walls brings to the fore the divisions and sentiments in Northern Nigeria. Following the June 2023 coup in Niger Republic that removed President Mohamed Bazoum, the Economic Community of West African States through the Nigerian leadership proposed military intervention to restore the constituted government to power. The strength of the Nigeria-Niger cross-border affinity resulted in a strong political lobby in Nigeria’s North that pushed against military intervention across the border. Religious leaders, intellectuals and civil society argued that colonial boundaries were far weaker than the ties between Northern Nigeria and Niger.

Additionally, Gen Musa’s call to construct fences along Nigeria’s national borders is an early warning and strategic fore sighting for the Nigerian government to prepare for the possibility of a collapse of the Sahel states and massive migration of people from these states to Nigeria for safe heaven amid the ranging political instability in the region. This is the first time a top Nigerian official has publicly suggested such a measure. The defence chief spoke at a security conference in the capital, Abuja.

THE NIGERIAN BOUNDARY

Nigeria is bordered to the north by Niger Republic, to the east by Chad and Cameroon and the south by the Gulf of Guinea and the Atlantic Ocean, and to the west by Bénin Republic. Nigeria shares land borders with four countries: Benin Republic in the South West with Lagos (Seme Border­) and Ogun state (Idi-Iroko), in the South with Cameroon at the Bakassi peninsula in the Gulf of Guinea. In the North by Niger Republic, Cameroon and Chad across 17 states. These borders are largely unmanned with porous entry points. The Nigerian northern borders play crucial roles in trade, security and cross-border relations, shaping the country’s economy, diplomacy and regional stability. The defence chief’s proposal is highly significant in the ongoing fight against terrorism, as Nigeria remains vulnerable to cross-border threats and armed groups operating from neighbouring countries. In the Sahel, Mali’s porous borders with Niger and Burkina Faso have similarly enabled al-Qaeda in the Maghreb’s arms trafficking. Border fencing, if paired with proper surveillance and cooperation with border communities, could significantly reduce the flow of weapons, insurgents, and criminal networks into the country. This is not just a security concern; it’s a national priority.

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If the proposition of the defence chief is implemented, the perimeter fences alone do not guarantee security if the areas are not manned adequately. Also, the border fences cannot absolve the government from the responsibility of beefing up border security in borderland areas for territorial integrity. There are concerns over the perpetual neglect of border communities as it relates to developmental and infrastructural drive, resulting in minimal commercial viability of these areas. If the trend of these economic woes continues, terrorists will leverage the worsening situation and collaborate with the vulnerable citizens across the border in perpetrating cross-border crimes.

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REGIONAL DILEMMA

In a strategic context, the current geo-political situation in the Sahel and West Africa is a justifiable national security factor for the construction of a long strip of border fence in Nigeria’s northern borderlands. The fragility of the states in the region should necessitate foresighted precautionary measures to tighten Nigeria’s security for territorial integrity. Since 2020, there have been nine coups in the Sahel, West and Central Africa. The region had witnessed coups in Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Chad, Burkina Faso, Niger and Gabon. This resurgence is largely attributed to domestic factors within the state; they include deterioration of the security situation and poor economic and social governance. Contested elections, alterations to the constitution, and extensions of terms have instigated various coups, with outcomes differing significantly; some resulted in the rapid restoration of civilian governance, whereas others led to extended military control or transitional governance structures. Additionally, factors such as poverty, ethnic diversity, fragile institutions, and a legacy of instability have been recognized as fundamental causes, ultimately giving rise to grievances, societal polarization, governance challenges, and a resurgence of political instability. Regional instability also played a major role in its resurgence as the Arab Spring of 2010 in North Africa exacerbated insecurity and led to the proliferation of weapons and armed fighters across the Sahel region, with cross-border terrorist and insurgent networks threatening territorial integrity and the security of the population in the region.

The Sahel region of Africa is the ‘epicentre of global terrorism’ and now, for the first time, accounts for ‘over half of all terrorism-related deaths,’ according to the Global Terrorism Index. According to the African Centre for Strategic Studies, the region is also a nexus of criminal networks and illicit trafficking and has experienced a rise in farmer-herder violence. Moreover, the Sahel has the fastest population growth rate on the continent, despite being among the poorest and facing some of the most fragile environmental conditions. Consequently, migrants from the Sahel constitute a significant share of those trying to cross the Mediterranean into Europe. Additionally, there could be a huge influx of fleeing vulnerable populations that could also make their way down to Nigeria’s porous northern borderland for safety due to the crisis in their country.

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Also, as militant Islamist violence in the Sahel continues to shift southward and westward, it is putting ever more pressure on population centres in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger as well as on their coastal West African neighbours. The Sahel has held the designation of the most lethal theatre of militant Islamist violence in Africa for four years in a row. The Sahel accounted for 55 per cent of all such fatalities, costing the lives of 10,400 people out of a total of 18,900 deaths continentally. An estimated 67 per cent of all non-combatants killed by militant Islamist groups in Africa are in the Sahel. Three Sahelian countries; Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are the focal point of militant Islamist violence in the region. This violence has widened in scale and scope in recent years. Fatalities linked to these groups are more than two and a half times the levels seen in 2020, when the first military coup in Mali occurred. Subsequent coups in Burkina Faso and Niger have also been followed by deteriorating security. Militant Islamist groups control more territory and transportation arteries in the three countries than at any point since the insurgencies began more than a decade ago. The widening security threat in the Sahelian countries is resulting in growing pressure on Nigeria and other neighbouring West African countries of Bénin, Togo, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Senegal and Mauritania.

To end insecurity in Nigeria, the federal government and the Armed Forces need to demonstrate greater decisive political will, firstly by cutting terror groups’ financial supply from their funders through a reignited kinetic and non-kinetic strategy. The main dilemma hangs on the assurance that the border fence will guarantee territorial integrity and security without a corresponding political will. However, while calls to construct perimeter fences along Nigeria’s borders highlight real security concerns, the scale and cost make such a measure largely unsustainable. A more effective strategy lies in investing in border communities, strengthening local infrastructure, livelihoods, and policing while deepening cross-border cooperation with neighbouring countries. Empowered communities and coordinated regional efforts offer a more resilient and inclusive approach to curbing transnational threats than physical barriers alone⎈

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