Buharism as an idea and as a brand has suffered from two major factors. First, Buhari’s performance in office was largely discouraging and disheartening. Notably, the Tinubu administration has largely distanced itself from Buhari’s tenure, and by indices that Nigerians often cite, ranging from foreign exchange rate to inflation, the country was worse off after two terms of a Buhari presidency. Even if the idea was right, the execution has been largely criticised and seldom had defenders apart from those who served in that government. However, the second factor is due to a lack of nonchalance in embedding the ideology beyond merely a powerful officeholder, but rather one that party members imbibed. For example, Trumpism, a more protectionist and isolationist ‘America First’ policy, has overwhelmed and taken control over the Republican Party and shown how a president can weaponize the powers of the office to influence an institution. But for reasons that the former president probably knows best, this was not his approach to governance.

This reluctance to define the party through his brand of leadership and his ideology affected APC. In times, it seemed like an arrangement had been made to ensure that the different blocs that created the party had their distinct representatives. Buhari, the presidential nominee, represented the defunct Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) group; Yemi Osinbajo, the vice-presidential nominee, represented the Tinubu-led Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) group; and John Odigie-Oyegun, the first national chair, was from the All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP) group. Both Bukola Saraki and Yakubu Dogara, who deftly manoeuvred their ways into emerging as heads of both chambers of the National Assembly, were former PDP members who defected ahead of the elections. This tenuous arrangement would ensure no one felt short-changed while the party grew.

The constituent parties agreed on the mostly agreeable policies—economic liberalization, poverty alleviation and building a functional middle class. Ironically, these policies were also similar to PDPs, which meant that politicians shuttling between the two engaged in superfluous ‘ideological debates’ to defend their moves. Husaini also makes the argument that most of Nigeria’s political parties appear to have converged along centre-right policy positions, perhaps adding to the discourse that there is no ideological difference. But even within this big tent, there were clear distinctions. While ACN governors pushed for considerable foreign investment and opted for increased privatization and more market-friendly policies, ANPP governors in Borno (Kashim Shettima), Yobe (Ibrahim Geidam) and Zamfara (Abdulaziz Yari) were largely handling security-related skirmishes. In contrast, Nasarawa’s CPC governor Tanko Al-Makura, primarily focused on physical infrastructure as a measure of performance. Even eventual Vice-President Osinbajo, who had been Tinubu’s attorney-general as Lagos State governor, would have been privy and involved in the active market-led reforms and less aligned with a Buhari with whom he ran.

Buhari’s influential chief of staff, Abba Kyari, and Mamman Daura, the éminence grise of his administration, would play key roles in ensuring that similar acolytes were placed in key positions. Babachir David Lawal, whose political and public service credentials were largely a litany of roles in the Buhari campaign, was appointed to the sensitive position of Secretary to the Government of the Federation. CPC loyalists retained key cabinet positions overseeing Agriculture, Communications, Education and Justice, emphasizing a desire to control more welfare and social provision roles. ACN was given mainly the more market-facing roles, but after Kemi Adeosun, Buhari’s first finance minister, resigned in 2018, it was deprived of the opportunity to actually direct fiscal policy. A bigger irony is that Godwin Emefiele, appointed by Buhari’s PDP predecessor, would shape monetary policy and defer to Buhari’s whims to stay in post.

Within APC, it became very clear that Buhari was reticent to utilize his evident electoral appeal in shaping the structures to his will. In 2018, despite initially supporting Odigie-Oyegun’s stay as party chair, Buhari was eventually pressured by governors to support a change in party leadership. Another chair change in 2020, following disputes at various levels, led to a power struggle before the creation of a caretaker committee, led by a sitting governor, for nearly two years. The lack of influence and control likely contributed to the failure of many Buhari loyalists in their bids for party nominations ahead of the 2023 general elections. With no apparent ‘heir’ to the Buharist mantle, and no champion to ensure his ‘bloc’ was returned to power, even Buhari’s belated attempt to influence the outcome of the presidential nomination failed and ensured he was unable to dictate how the party would function after his departure.

Looming large over Buhari’s administration was Tinubu’s ubiquitous presence. After reportedly declining to be named as vice-president, owing to concerns over a same-faith ticket being used to amplify opposition narratives around Buhari’s extremism, he was allowed to nominate his replacement. But Tinubu’s influence in a government under a party he helped form was whittled down. He did not nominate other cabinet members, and there were reports of his former proteges being used to curb his influence in his home South West region. This reportedly came to a head when Buhari used a function to correct the term ‘national leader’ that had been ascribed to Tinubu in his presence. That term, which is usually reserved for presidents when a party is in power, must no doubt have played into any insecurities over Buhari’s status within APC. Whatever their divisions, Tinubu supported Buhari’s re-election bid before anchoring his presidential bid on the notion that it was his turn after bringing the APC to power.

Buhari’s eight years as president have been thoroughly unpacked and analysed. There is no doubt about his political capital and appeal; while some may question his capacity to govern, he presented an ideology that people bought into. But establishing an ideology goes beyond simply voicing it or being associated with the ideas. It comes down to execution, which appeals to doubters and leads to converts, and then to evangelists who carry the message long after the name sake is no more. There is no shortage of politicians today who still base their political views and ideology on former prominent figures from Nigerian history. What this means, in the case of Buharism, is that while his record remains contentious, he would have been able to avert as much scrutiny or criticism if a preferred successor had been chosen. However, his departure paved the way for the ascent of a man whose own ideology contradicted his own.