The Economic Uncertainties of the AfCFTA Amidst Regional Conflict

Illustration by Kingsley Chibueze / THE REPUBLIC.

THE MINISTRY OF business x the economy

The Economic Uncertainties of the AfCFTA Amidst Regional Conflict

The AfCFTA’s potential to transform intra-African trade risks being undermined by the volatility created by instability in the Sahel and Great Lakes regions.
AfCFTA

Illustration by Kingsley Chibueze / THE REPUBLIC.

THE MINISTRY OF business x the economy

The Economic Uncertainties of the AfCFTA Amidst Regional Conflict

The AfCFTA’s potential to transform intra-African trade risks being undermined by the volatility created by instability in the Sahel and Great Lakes regions.

In a market in Bamako, Mali, one is likely to find a textile trader anxiously awaiting a fabric shipment from neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire. Days turn into weeks, and his goods remain stuck at a checkpoint controlled by armed groups demanding hefty bribes. With each passing day, his profits shrink, forcing him to raise prices. As a result, customers turn to cheaper alternatives, and his main source of livelihood hangs in the balance. The trader’s struggle is not unique. Across Africa, insecurity is disrupting trade routes, deterring investments and undermining the promise of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

Established in 2018, the AfCFTA is the largest free-trade area by number of member states, encompassing 1.3 billion people across the world’s second-largest continent. The AfCFTA Agreement (the Agreement) aims to create a single market for goods and services across 54 member states by eliminating tariffs and non-tariff barriers, facilitating the free movement of business travellers and investments, and establishing a unified customs union to streamline trade on the continent.

However, persistent conflicts in regions like the Sahel and the Great Lakes pose a major threat to the AfCFTA’s success. Armed insurgencies, political instability, and cross-border criminal networks make trade costly and unpredictable, raising concerns about whether the AfCFTA can truly succeed under such conditions.

How much does conflict impact trade flows, regional value chains and market access? How do we measure the financial burden and economic toll of instability on businesses? The effectiveness of African-led security initiatives, such as the G5 Sahel Force and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) peacekeeping missions, in addressing these threats is put to the test. The central question remains: Can the AfCFTA function effectively amid ongoing conflicts or will insecurity continue to hinder Africa’s economic integration?

THE IMPACT OF INSECURITY ON TRADE FLOWS

Mali, in West Africa, is home to the historic trade cities of Timbuktu and Gao, where trading communities are important and markets attract nomadic and rural populations. As a landlocked country, it has two primary entry points for trade in the north and south. Kayes and Sikasso-Zégoua in the south provide access for imports from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. In the north, commodities enter Mali via three main routes: from Mauritania into Timbuktu; from Algeria (Tamanrasset) through Kidal; and from other northern African countries including Libya and Egypt through Niger and Ménaka.

In 2012, Malian state services, including the army and customs administration, withdrew from northern areas such as Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal, which were controlled by rebels and jihadist groups. In 2015, the customs administration gradually redeployed staff to Timbuktu and Gao. However, customs presence remains absent at the borders with Mauritania and Algeria. It is important to recognize that violence itself may not directly impact trade routes, as customs experts Thomas Cantens and Gaël Raballand argue that, ‘the major driver of change may not be insecurity itself, but rather the state’s response to it.’

According to Cantens and Raballand, the first state response is a non-response. This is illustrated above in the absence and withdrawal of state services from crucial border points in Mali. In this instance, the administration of these areas is often taken over by local militias who levy informal taxes on traders still using the same trade routes. The state’s non-response greatly changed the dynamics of trade flows in the region, as militias now effectively rule the roost. They now exercise control over what trade occurs and on what terms it is carried out. For instance, a jihadist group may permit trade based on religion, while discrediting others. They also levy informal taxes and detain or delay whomever they wish. In this instance, the trade routes do not change due to prevalent violence but merely become operable under the terms of the new informal administration.

On the contrary, when the state responds by closing its borders and enforces closure, there would be a change in trade routes. In 2015, the Chadian government banned large vessels from using Lake Chad due to Boko Haram’s usage of boats to attack the islands. The main roads between Lagos, Nigeria, and N’djamena via Lake Chad, and those through Fotokol and Kousseri in Cameroon have also been closed. As a result, new trade routes were established through Niger, affecting the prices of traded goods. A single vessel on the Lake Chad could transport an equivalent of three truckloads of goods now going through Niger. The undeniable increase in transport costs will be borne by the end user. This further exacerbated the challenge of boosting the already low levels of intra-African trade under the AfCFTA, as disruptions like these undermine its success. Higher transport costs make goods more expensive and less competitive, limiting the potential benefits of the AfCFTA. In effect, insecurity erodes the trust and reliability needed to establish strong regional value chains and fully harness the benefits of a unified African market.

The impact of border insecurity on landlocked countries is profound, particularly in Africa, which has the highest number of landlocked countries in the world—16 out of 49, all of which are developing. These countries face unique challenges due to their remoteness and lack of direct access to the sea, isolating them from global markets. Their seaborne trade unavoidably depends on transit through neighbouring coastal countries, making them dependent on the political stability, infrastructure, and institutional efficiency of these transit countries. The closure of borders or existence of persistent hindrances to trade inevitably increases the rate of smuggling in these regions. The absence of state oversight allows for illicit trade which, in turn, finances these local militias.

The role of illicit high-value mineral trade from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the financing armed groups and contributing to the protracted conflict cannot be overstated. Companies and private actors continue to source key mineral resources like tin, tantalum, tungsten and gold from rebels, thus financing their activities. For example, in April 2024, the M23 group established dominance over the mineral-rich region and created a new transportation route to Rwanda. Through taxation and smuggling of minerals, the armed group profits from the DRC’s mineral wealth, with estimates suggesting it earns approximately $800,000 monthly from the production and trade of minerals at Rubaya alone. Many private sector actors have also fallen short in implementing supply chain due diligence in line with international standards. Some turn a blind eye, and avoid questioning the source of their purchases, or rely too heavily on industry schemes despite evident red flags.

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THE ECONOMIC TOLL OF INSECURITY AND INSTABILITY ON BUSINESSES

We can draw a straight line from regional instability to the increased financial burden on businesses and establishments in the affected regions. Regions facing armed conflicts, banditry, violence and terrorism experience greater costs in the transportation of goods due to additional security measures to protect merchandize, insurance premiums and logistical inefficiencies. When trade routes pass through areas embroiled in conflict, insurance companies charge higher premiums to mitigate risks such as hijackings, theft and destruction of goods. For instance, in northern Nigeria where the insurgency of Boko Haram persists, insurance costs for transporting goods have surged.

Insecurity and violence compel transporters to avoid dangerous routes, thus leading to longer distances and increased transport costs, undermining the AfCFTA’s goal to facilitate the smooth and efficient movement of capital, goods and services. In the Sahel, truck drivers travelling between Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are forced to take alternative routes due to terrorist activity. These diversions not only increase operational costs incurred by businesses and delay deliveries but also undermine efficiency, disrupt the ease of doing business, and weaken regional value chains.

Additionally, businesses operating in high-risk areas often have to hire armed escorts or private security outfits to protect shipments. They are unable to depend on state or governmental protection and must take these matters into their hands. Private security companies, such as G4S, who provide security for businesses and mining companies in the DRC are the major beneficiaries of this arrangement.

The financial burden borne by businesses is worsened by the bribes they are forced to pay at illegal checkpoints set up by armed groups and local militias. These groups impose levies on traders plying trade and supply routes to finance their activities. These added expenses in moving goods across the border are ultimately shifted to the consumers, leading to higher product prices in markets.

Importantly, the instability and perpetual conflict in these regions, encompassing violence, terrorism, insurgency and crime also discourage long-term foreign direct investment (FDI) into African markets. It causes a decline in investor confidence which in turn leads to a decline in FDI due to perceived risks to investment safety and personnel well-being. According to global affairs think tank, ODI Global, countries that are in conflict have on average 40 per cent less in FDI flows than countries that are at peace. Conflict and instability disrupt business operations by hindering supply chains and increasing costs, thus deterring potential investors. It also impedes infrastructure development and political stability, both critical elements for attracting FDI.

This poses a serious threat to the implementation of the AfCFTA Protocol on Investment, which aims to create a unified, secure and attractive investment landscape across Africa. The Protocol is designed to promote intra-African investment flows and FDI by ensuring investor protection, improving the ease of doing business and fostering stable and transparent regulatory frameworks. However, the continued rise of insecurity and instability across several African regions poses a direct threat to the realization of these goals, casting doubt on Africa’s capacity to offer the investment promises envisioned under the Protocol.

Generally, long-term investments thrive in stable environments where risks are minimal. Regions plagued by political instability often see a decline in investment, as persistent conflict creates an image of unsafe investment grounds to the international community. This makes these areas a much less viable option for investment in the minds of African and foreign investors.

Nonetheless, it is worth noting that FDI still enters conflict zones, particularly in industries accustomed to operating under difficult conditions, where the high risks investors take may pay off during a country’s reconstruction. The United Nations Development Programme found that during the last five years of the Algerian Civil War (1998-2002), FDI increased over 155 per cent, ‘because the oil majors were circling around and keen to get involved at the earliest opportunity.’ Yet, these remain exceptions and not the norm. For most investors, stability and security are non-negotiable.

Insecurity in regions like the Sahel and Great Lakes has severely disrupted local business operations in many ways. The persistent fear of violence and terrorist attacks, including bombings, kidnappings and armed assaults, has forced many business owners to close their shops temporarily or permanently. The situation is particularly worse for micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), which are the main engine of economic growth and the major generators of employment globally. In Africa, MSMEs account for nearly 90 per cent of all businesses, provide about 80 per cent of employment, and contribute 40 per cent of the continent’s GDP. Despite the central role they play in Africa’s economy and the success of the AfCFTA, MSMEs face persistent challenges such as limited access to finance and markets. In conflict-affected regions, these challenges are further compounded by instability that disrupts supply chains, raises operational costs, and deters investment. Consequently, MSMEs in these areas are among the hardest hit, struggling to survive amid economic uncertainty.

Finally, the general economic decline resulting from insecurity diminishes the purchasing power of consumers. As local economies weaken, disposable incomes decline, leading to reduced demand for goods and services. This reduction in consumption makes it difficult for businesses to cover operational costs and sustain themselves. Thus, affecting the livelihood of traders, who depend on their businesses for survival.

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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF REGIONAL SECURITY FRAMEWORKS

The G5 Sahel Joint Force (La Force Conjointe du G5 Sahel or the FC-G5S) was set up in 2017 by the heads of state of the Group of Five for the Sahel (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger). The FC-G5S aims to enhance security, protect civilian populations, and foster a stable environment for the socio-economic development of the region. This is achieved by pooling and multiplying their national efforts to fight against common security threats.

The FC-G5S was formed to specifically address the rising threat of extremist terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, and other armed militias. It is expected that by deploying military patrols and setting up safe zones along trade routes, the force can prevent attacks by terrorist groups, thus, ensuring the free movement of goods. Through a joint effort, the FC-G5S could optimally retake crucial border points under the control of armed groups and dismantle illegal and informal checkpoints.

However, numerous challenges have prevented the FC-G5S from achieving its desired goals. Funding and co-ordination among national governments remain a hindrance to its effectiveness. The FC-G5S faces significant funding problems due to its heavy reliance on external donors, with member countries themselves being among the poorest in the world. This leads to a lack of substantial domestic funding and makes the force vulnerable to inconsistent international support and foreign influence, often resulting in shortfalls in funding needed for operations.

Other challenges include the withdrawal of some member countries, leaving the fate of the FC-G5S hanging by a thread. On 2 December 2023, Burkina Faso and Niger announced their withdrawal from the G5 Sahel citing reasons such as the failure of the group to achieve its objectives and the lack of independence. Mali had previously withdrawn from the bloc in 2022. These three countries have also gone ahead to set up their own cooperation pact known as the Alliance of Sahel States and are getting set to deploy 5,000 troops in the central Sahel region. On 6 December 2023, Chad and Mauritania, the remaining G5 Sahel countries, suggested that they were prepared to dissolve the G5 Sahel, which, according to its founding convention, can be terminated at the request of at least three of its member states.

In a similar vein, the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the military arm of ECOWAS, was formed in 1990 to regularly intervene in conflicts within the region. Its first notable action was when the regional bloc made an unprecedented move to intervene in the Liberian Civil War in 1990. The initial ECOMOG contingent comprised 3,000 troops from Nigeria, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone, with additional soldiers from Mali. ECOMOG was also active in Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire and Mali with varying levels of success. As a formidable and experienced military body, ECOMOG could have helped maintain law and order by securing trade routes and stabilizing these conflict-prone areas.

Yet, as with the FC-G5S, ECOMOG faced several key problems in its time, including funding issues, a lack of political consensus among member states, logistical challenges, concerns about neutrality due to Nigeria’s dominant role in the force, difficulties in maintaining command and control, differences in training and equipment across contingents and potential accusations of human rights abuses during deployments in conflict zones. These factors hindered its effectiveness in peacekeeping operations across West Africa. Now defunct, ECOMOG has transitioned to the ECOWAS Standby Force, which was recently activated on 11 March 2025, to curb terrorism and transborder crimes in the sub-region. However, its impact is uncertain, as key affected countries like Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger have withdrawn from ECOWAS.

The failure of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) to stop smuggling highlights the fact that even western intervention does not fare much better. The Congolese government requested the mission’s withdrawal in September 2023, citing its failure to prevent attacks by the many armed groups in eastern DRC. Public resentment towards MONUSCO has grown amid frustration that, after 20 years, the mission has failed to stop the violence or protect civilians as mandated.

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CAN THE AFCFTA SUCCEED AMIDST ONGOING CONFLICTS?

The AfCFTA holds immense potential to transform Africa’s economy. The single continental market is expected to increase intra-African trade by 52.3 per cent, generate jobs, deepen continental integration, increase productivity and create inclusive opportunities by including women and youth in Africa’s trade liberalization. The World Bank projects that the AfCFTA will increase Africa’s income by $450 billion by 2035 and intra-African exports by more than 81 per cent. According to the UN Economic Commission for Africa, the AfCFTA will further enable the African economy to reach the US$29 trillion mark by 2050.

However, this potential may not be fully realized if security and instability challenges are not addressed. The AfCFTA is member-driven but when some are grappling with internal crises like conflict, it becomes difficult to effectively implement and benefit from the agreement. It is also important to note that the ultimate goal of the AfCFTA is to deepen Africa’s economic integration which cannot happen when the bonds that should unite the continent are weakened by conflict. Therefore, the greatest win of the AfCFTA would not merely be the elimination of tariffs but the removal of non-tariff barriers, including instability and insecurity.

Ongoing conflicts in the Sahel and Great Lakes place a blanket over the lamp of the AfCFTA, but they do not extinguish it. However, for the lamp to shine brighter, they must be addressed. This is no doubt an African problem that can be solved by Africans, rather than looking to the West to swoop in and save the day, as precedent has shown the ineffectiveness of such an approach. Stability in these regions can only be attained through regional cooperation. In the Great Lakes, stability cannot be attained unless the DRC and Rwanda reach a consensus. Similarly, the insecurity in the Sahel cannot be effectively addressed without constructive engagement between the military-led governments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger and regional bodies like ECOWAS. A coordinated and inclusive approach is essential to fostering long-term stability in the region which would in turn enable cost-effective trade and economic integration

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