Can Nigeria’s Centre Hold?

Nigeria

Photo illustration by Dami Mojid / THE REPUBLIC.

THE MINISTRY OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Can Nigeria’s Centre Hold?

With the establishment of regional commissions, is Nigeria inching close to true federalism or witnessing the failure of the current governance system?
Nigeria

Photo illustration by Dami Mojid / THE REPUBLIC.

THE MINISTRY OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

Can Nigeria’s Centre Hold?

With the establishment of regional commissions, is Nigeria inching close to true federalism or witnessing the failure of the current governance system?

Last year’s change of the National Anthem is not the only attempt by the current government that’s a throwback to Nigeria’s First Republic (1960–1966). For some time now, there has been tacit acknowledgement that present governance structures are not fit for purpose, leading to the scrambling for a change in approach by the current administration. First, there is the July 2024 Supreme Court ruling that ensured the federal government could bypass state governments and pay funds directly to local government councils. This ruling could shake up state affairs and challenge the firm grip state governors have historically had in their respective regions. Second, the ongoing debate on restructuring the value-added tax system might weaken the advantage that more populous states have had, leading to opposition by some state governors. Policies like the ones mentioned can change how Nigerians interact with their leaders since local government chairs will have little excuse for not executing policies and state governments will be forced to move beyond relying on these federal allocations. 

However, a third point: the increasing acknowledgment of regional coordination in driving development is the end product of a process that started under the Umaru Musa Yar’Adua administration (2007–2010). It might be the solution for Nigeria’s unwieldy states. Nigeria has made considerable effort to get regionalism back on the table. During President Bola Tinubu’s cabinet reshuffle in October 2024, he dissolved the Ministry of Niger Delta Development and created the Ministry of Regional Development. This ministry is charged with managing the regional development commissions established, and awaiting presidential assent, at the federal level. But as these commissions take flight, there is the question of how these different levels of management and representation fit into Nigeria’s elaborate and labyrinthine governance architecture. It leads to a wider question: is the country’s manner of governance effective and fit for purpose? 

A HISTORY OF DIVISION

One of the more contentious recommendations from the 2014 Nigerian Constitutional Conference was the creation of 18 more states in the country, which would bring the total to 54. The idea has often been mooted in different forms but continues to persist today. In February 2024, the Federal House of Representatives considered the creation of three new states; in December 2024, there was a bill to create a coastal state out of Ondo; in January 2025, Peoples Gazette reported presidential support for the creation of ‘Ijebu State’ out of present-day Ogun State; and in February 2025, one year later, the House of Representatives proposed a list of 31 new states. For many politicians, the creation of new states would help solve many of the country’s issues, including those concerning representation and fears of marginalization. But this decision has never been a cure-all.  

On 1 January 1900, Britain assumed control of northern Nigeria from the Royal Niger Company. To manage the territory, the British employed indirect rule, a method where local chiefs managed the affairs of their different chiefdoms as ‘native authorities’. However, there was also a division of the region into 13 different provinces for administrative management. These provinces were delineated into divisions and further divided into districts. The colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria were united into a new colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria in 1906, before being amalgamated into Nigeria in 1914. Southern Nigeria was further divided into eastern and western Nigeria in 1939. Altogether, there was a chiefdom for Lagos and twelve provinces—six in the west and six in the east 

After independence, regionalism continued to play a more active role in the Nigerian administration. Each region had a more ceremonial governor, and a premier, who headed the regional government. Provinces, however, and local governments to a greater extent, were subjugated by regions seeking more power and influence against the central government. This became an even stronger issue after the two coups of 1966 and the growing bid for secession by the eastern region under Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu. It led to a meeting in Aburi, Ghana in January 1967 to discuss a way forward and to try and address concerns surrounding Nigeria’s governing structure.  

However, on 27 May 1967, the head of state, General Yakubu Gowon, announced the creation of twelve states out of the existing four regions (the Mid-Western Region having been created in 1963). Gowon’s regime used the rationale of trying to avert the domination of minority groups by the larger ethnic groups, but there is a fair consensus that this was mostly done to weaken the strength and size of the Eastern Region ahead of a potential war. The creation of the South-Eastern and Rivers states ensured that more groups did not see the need to unite under the old Eastern Region—which was now mostly the East-Central state. This move played a role in shaping the way citizens approached the war and meant the secessionist state was fighting a war on two fronts—against the federal Nigerian state and within its territory.  

After the war ended in 1970, different groups saw the creation of states as a safeguard against marginalization and a way to ensure control over their destiny in the country. Individuals also saw a way to ensure influence by being strongmen able to direct affairs in their fiefdoms. In 1975, Murtala Muhammed—Gowon’s successor as head of state—created a panel led by Justice Ayo Irikefe to look into state creation. Under consideration were economic viability and spurring development. Yet, as would become the case in future delineations, a competing focus was to ensure that some could realistically claim a piece of federal revenue and determine how to share it. As preparations continued towards the return to civilian rule in 1979 and the role that states would play in the national legislature and revenue allocation, an ‘arms race’ of state creation to procure influence was set off.  

No states were created in the Second Republic (1979–1983) despite the National Assembly’s recommendation of 29 states in June 1983. In 1987, Katsina, carved out of Kaduna, and Akwa Ibom, carved out of Cross River, were created to make the number of states at that time 21. These changes could be traced to the electoral debacle that followed the 1979 elections and the need to determine what two-thirds of the states in the country were. But while the 1987 changes followed prior recommendations and addressed deep-seated conflicts, the 1991 changes seemed to validate the more negative impressions on statehood. There were three states created in the east—Abia, Anambra and Delta—Osun in the west, and five in the north—Jigawa, Kebbi, Kogi, Taraba, and Yobe. This led to 16 states in the north and 14 in the south, further adding to the perceived imbalance and cementing the sentiment that states were a way for groups to remain relevant. 

General Sani Abacha seized power in 1993 and proceeded to create another committee led by Chief Arthur Mbanefo. There were requests for 72 new states and, on 1 October 1996, Abacha announced the creation of Bayelsa (out of Rivers), Ebonyi (out of Abia and Enugu), Ekiti (out of Ondo), Gombe (out of Bauchi), Nasarawa (out of Plateau) and Zamfara (out of Sokoto). These changes remain the last successful attempt at state creation and maintain the oft-cited imbalance between states in the north (19) and south (17).  

The clamour for new states has persisted, especially with the return to democracy. For some, the claims are to correct a historical disparity. Of the 13 provinces that northern Nigeria was divided into, only two have not been made states—Zaria, in present-day Kaduna, and Kabba, in present-day Kogi. The situation is a bit different in southern Nigeria, albeit with a smaller landmass and more groups to placate. It is also difficult to consider because several provinces have been broken into several present-day states. Parts of present-day Akwa Ibom and Cross River states were in the Calabar and Ogoja provinces, Enugu was in the Onitsha and Owerri provinces, and even the Cameroons province is now part of Cameroon, following the 1961 British Cameroons referendum. 

In western Nigeria, most of the provinces appear to have been aptly carved out—such as the old Ondo province giving birth to Ekiti and Ondo, the old Benin province producing Delta and Edo, and the Warri province being subsumed into Delta. The major difference appears to be the apparent merger of the Abeokuta and Ijebu provinces into Ogun State, explaining the recent clamour for an Ijebu State, which would be present-day Ogun East. These claims would no doubt hold more weight in any serious conversation on state creation despite the difficulty in achieving this so far. But a more necessary discussion would be on how Nigeria and Nigerians choose to interact with these states.  

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AN ARRANGED MARRIAGE

Federalism has been described in different ways, notably focusing on the relationship between the federal government and its sub-national units. In Nigeria, like most post-colonial countries, this has taken on a more outsized role because of the forced collage of ethnic groups and kingdoms that make up the nation. There is a tenuous understanding that changing these structures would require difficult processes that the country and world appear unprepared to engage with. There have been successes in some cases, like South Sudan, but even then after protracted warfare and conflict.  

African states are not immune to the recent wave of nationalist rhetoric and insularity that appears to be in vogue globally. Donald Trump, despite including Africans in his ‘shit-hole countries’ narrative and repeated restriction concerning immigration processes, is not out of place among African political considerations. The international liberal order, put in place after the Cold War, has seen a restriction of pathways to prosperity. This means that in countries with frail bonds uniting disparate viewpoints, cultures and histories, it can be easy to withdraw into primordial identities and seek security there. In an actual federation, it would mean that states are both economically viable and structurally capable of providing for their citizens. It would mean that governors, commissioners, state legislators and local government chairs are scrutinized to a higher level than a president because of their closeness to the people. It would mean that there is a constant negotiation of states and the federal government, as equals, because of the joint responsibility of delivering for citizens.  

This argument is at the core of Nigeria’s brand of federalism, and its evident failings. It is why, despite repeated instances of elected leaders being either unwilling or unable to use the resources available to grow their states, there is still a clamour for further division, with its accompanying costs, to promote a new coterie of leaders. It is why Nigeria has been described as practising ‘feeding bottle federalism’, because of the imbalanced power dynamic in the way federal and state governments interact. In the definition of federalism employed by academic Professor K.C Wheare, he describes a federal government that is an independent authority in some areas, and where independent regional authorities coordinate with, and are not subordinate to, the others. But this is neither applicable nor feasible because of the nature of Nigeria’s states and is at the heart of fears of further state creation. 

Take, for example, the increasing balkanization and proliferation of Pentecostal churches in Nigeria, with a mandate to win more souls for Christ and strengthen its influence through the size of its membership. This means that there are actual feasibility studies undertaken—population, competition, capacity and size—before planting new parishes. If we apply this metric to the creation of most states, we will see that many of them are not viable to stand alone. Many of these arrangements for the creation of new states only exist to further pre-colonial notions of autonomy within a wider national structure. This mentality persists, with some citing provincial arrangements as justification for the creation of their states. 

Perhaps most tellingly, the desire for more states is an admission of a sustained failure of governance. In seeking direct access to federal funds, there is a clear mistrust in the stewards who were responsible for ensuring judicious distribution before. In seeking direct representation in government appointments, there is a clear complaint about the imbalanced approach to enforcing meritorious and representative leadership. In seeking territorial security, there is a clear fear of marginalization by some ethnic groups by the larger and more known tribes. Creating states is a solution to problems that are likely to persist even if every household becomes a state unto itself.  

Representation appears to be the safeguard with which Nigeria’s different ethnic groups seek clarity and security in a weighty arrangement. This is why there’s a larger focus on federal character and ethnic composition in appointments. While these points hold weight and ensure people feel represented, there is a deeper and more underlying question on whether, after 65 years, Nigeria has succeeded in convincing Nigerians that their identity is more tied to the nation than to their states of origin. In a 1957 interview, Chief Obafemi Awolowo asserted that Nigerians were beginning to think of themselves as citizens of a great nation. A civil war and decades later, this assertion might not be as firm as one would hope.  

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A NEW FORM OF NIGERIAN FEDERALISM

Before the creation of the Ministry of Regional Development, the first regional commission established was the Niger Delta Development Commission in 2000 to attend to issues and development in the Niger Delta. This led to the creation of a Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs in President Yar’Adua’s first cabinet in 2007, which was meant to address the violence in the region and the need to provide needed development aid. The commission was not limited to a geopolitical zone with the inclusion of Abia, Imo and Ondo states that are not in the South South region.  

The creation of the North-East Development Commission in 2017 aimed to consolidate ongoing efforts to address the insurgency in the North East and was the first initiative to explicitly focus on a geopolitical zone. This prompted calls for additional commissions, which the Tinubu administration has sought to address with the July 2024 establishment of the North-West and South-East Development Commissions. Both were strongly advocated for by the deputy leaders of the National Assembly, Kano senator, Barau Jibrin, and Abia representative, Benjamin Kalu, who represent both commission zones. Since then, efforts have intensified to address the remaining two zones that were left out. In July 2024, the Senate passed a bill to create a similar commission for the North Central region, and in September 2024, it passed another bill for the establishment of one for the South West. A similar bill to create a commission for the South South region was passed in October 2024. In February 2025, Tinubu signed into law the bill establishing the North-Central Development Commission. With the creation of a ministry to oversee regional development, these attempts at parity will likely receive presidential assent soon. 

This also means that 58 years after Nigeria abandoned a regional form of government, it has surreptitiously incorporated regional politics into its governance. While the commissions for the Niger Delta and North East attended to clear crises ranging from insurgencies to communal clashes, the creation of the four other zonal commissions appear designed to attend to worries of not receiving necessary government funds. For example, the North Central’s commission was the only one not included in the 2025 budget, with the South West included despite a similar delay in being formally established.  

However, a formal incorporation of regional development is not without its drawbacks. First, there is a clear duplication of responsibilities between federal and state governments. Earlier mandates for the Niger Delta and North East commissions, followed clear interventions that were time-bound and incorporated state governments in ensuring sustainable solutions. While there are clear needs for targeted interventions in other parts of the country, haphazardly creating commissions simply duplicates functions that are already meant to be shared by the federal and state governments. Furthermore, the considerable investment in staffing and overhead costs will not add to the actual delivery of these mandates.  

Second, this duplication of responsibilities can lead to poor effective collaboration. The jury is still out on how effective the new Ministry of Regional Development will be, but it will need to succeed by identifying unique challenges to augment state efforts. Ideally, this should mean focusing on one-off interventions or quick wins, while freeing states to focus on more pressing duties. But it also begs the question of how effective these collaborations will be, especially when other federal ministries will no doubt have state-based projects as well, and how best to prioritize equity or equality. A case can be made that these attempts could help balance the present inequality between states—after all, Kano and Lagos will have different priorities from Ekiti and Bayelsa—but the likely case is that funding will be driven or directed to those that can leverage influence to direct projects.  

Third, and most pertinent, is the challenge of ensuring effective accountability. State governors are elected by citizens, and are expected to conduct themselves to retain the trust of the electorate and gain re-election. However, regional commissions are administered, funded and staffed by the federal government, which means that they are solely accountable to the presidency. If a president is content with an appointee’s performance, even if they are not delivering on their mandate, it is nearly impossible to hold them to account. It can also be politically volatile as a president can decide to utilize the influence and powers of a regional commission to counter leaders in zones that are not as sympathetic to their party or their election.  

Nigerian leaders have long sought to establish partnerships along regional lines for mutual development. There are governor forums along regional, party and zonal lines to ensure collaboration and promote camaraderie. Regionalism, especially as practised in the First Republic, was also very helpful in promoting beneficial competition between parts of the country as they sought to outperform each other in delivering for their citizens. Many infrastructure achievements and success stories, from projects to stadiums to universities, can be traced to that era. But the wariness is in simply incorporating it as a way to manage deep-seated fears within the country. 

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A NATION OF STATES

Nigeria exists in its current form because, as a people, there has been no consensus on how best to proceed and what it means for its citizens. In 1787, after winning the war of independence against the United Kingdom, the 13 colonies that would form the United States had a conference to discuss a way forward. The raging debate was whether these states should go at it alone, with the possibility of becoming vassal states to some European powers, or whether they should unite and form an independent nation. The result was the formal creation of the United States of America, which was agreed upon with the ratification of the constitution. There have been debates and secession attempts, as well as additions and expansions; the US is by no means a perfect model, nor is it a bastion of consensus, but it is an example of process. 

By the strength of its population and the breadth of its mass, Nigeria is a unique country among the many artificially constructed states of the colonial era. It is indeed many countries in one, which comes with a commensurate challenge of how best to govern and function. But there are seldom any states that are better off outside of the relative safety and security of the country’s considerable financial and human capital. If there is an agreement there, then there can be progress in agreeing on what relationship to observe. If there is a preference for semi-autonomy, then there can be no expectation or entitlement for support from other territories within the country. And if there is a clear need for federal support and intervention, then it is a clear acknowledgement that some responsibilities at the state level should be abdicated and a re-orientation of what the states should be held accountable for. 

As preparations begin towards future elections, there will be more discussions and attempts to assuage pressing concerns. These new commissions could be seen as ways to cater to more constituencies and ensure that more people feel the accessibility of federal funds. Likewise, any attempt to create new states will be seen with the same approach. But further division or stratification of Nigeria’s governance structure, without addressing root causes and fears, will only kick the can down the road. The longer these discussions are delayed, the more susceptible to disruption Nigeria remains—and then things will really fall apart

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