Haile Selassie I and Pan-African Diplomacy

Emperor Menelik I and his consort, Empress Taitu, were perhaps the first to fully embrace the idea that the imperial nation must ‘stretch out her hands’ to Africans everywhere, that a united front was imperative to face the increasing pressure of European expansion. Moreover, there was a substantial contribution of diasporans particularly during Menelik I’s reign. During the Battle of Adwa (1896) in which Ethiopia first defeated Italy’s imperialist advances, Menelik I and Empress Taitu were accompanied by the Haitian politician and diplomat, Benito Sylvain. Syvlain’s service to Ethiopia was a strategic move for pan-Africanism as an intermediary between W.E.B. Du Bois and Menelik I. Indeed, Sylvain would represent both Ethiopia and Haiti at the 1900 Pan-African Conference in England partly organized by Du Bois. Through this evolving connectivity between the continent and diaspora, the Battle of Adwa further crystallized Ethiopia in the pan-African consciousness as an eternal promise of prophetic liberation: ‘princes shall come out of Egypt; Ethiopia shall stretch out her hands unto God.’ Pan-Africanism would lie dormant but nevertheless ever-present in post-Menelik Ethiopia, leaving his successor, Emperor Haile Selassie I, to directly inherit the vision and power of a united Africa. Approaching the coronation of Haile Selassie I in 1930, Du Bois himself sat with Melaku Bayen, an important official in Selassie I’s government, to discuss the potential of a new era of global African relations within Selassie I’s regime.

INHERITING THE FUTURE

Just as Menelik I had Benito Sylvain, Selassie I had a circle of Ethiopian intelligentsia, like Bayen, who had been influenced by their exile into the West during the Italian occupation (1935-1937) and subsequently into Black liberation and pan-African ideologies. Ethiopia’s second victory over Fascist Italy took on another layer of significance as not only an emblem of African power, but also as a visceral reminder of the penetrability of European imperialism, as historian, Belete Balachew Yihun writes that it was the Ethiopian intelligentsia who witnessed the reaction of Africans everywhere who thus ‘disseminated the Bandung and Pan-African spirits among the higher strata of the Ethiopian Empire.’ This intelligentsia also included Foreign Minister Ketema Yifru, a critical figure who largely acted on behalf of Selassie I in developing diplomatic relations with the newly independent African nations.

However, it would take time before Ethiopian rule manifested a concrete response to those Black people which supported Ethiopia through its second battle with Italy in deep conviction to Pan-Africanism. Selassie I as a representative of centuries-old diplomatic policies within the empire, had an ambivalent relationship with the European powers. On one hand, he had witnessed the unreliability and indifference held by Europe towards the Italian occupation of Ethiopia, despite being ‘allied’ or at least conjoined through the League of Nations. Moreover, though Britain eventually came to the rescue of Ethiopia, only when Benito Mussolini threatened to extend his campaign to British possessions in Africa, the refusal to withdraw the British troops from Ethiopian territory after the battle was over was in effect perceived by Selassie I and his government as another occupation. On the other hand, he saw political potential in reinvigorating old diplomatic relationships with Europe and now the US which in previous centuries arguably protected Ethiopia against European colonialism.

Yihun writes that ‘if the country’s identification with African causes was based on emotions, the ones with British and American causes took the shape of economic and political dependence.’ True to the legacy of diplomacy within Ethiopian rule, Selassie I spent the first decade or so after the liberation of Ethiopia tending to political ties with the West to little avail. The support by Western powers for the annexation of critical parts of Ethiopia to create a ‘Greater Somalia’ was apparently the last straw, and Ethiopia officially reoriented its diplomatic efforts to the ‘third world’ through its participation in the Afro-Asian Bandung Conference of 1955, which also included attendance from the Gold Coast (Ghana), Liberia, Egypt, Libya, and Sudan. However, though Ethiopia enjoyed comradery at the conference with their neighbours Egypt, Sudan, and Libya, the conference had unintended adverse effects for Ethiopia.

TOWARDS AFRICAN UNITY

Though the conference was intended to promote Afro-Asian diplomacy between newly independent states, the predominance of Asian and Arab countries at the conference seemed to rather stimulate an offshoot of Pan-Arabism. This meant that the influential governments of Gamal Abdel Nasser and Muammar Gaddafi in Egypt and Libya, Ethiopia’s neighbours respectively, would increasingly turn to Pan-Arabism rather than Pan-Africanism. However, it must be said that the latter would eventually reorient towards one of the most significant Pan-African campaigns arguably since Kwame Nkrumah. The former was also a critical figure in Afro-Asiatic unity, forming the Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity Organization in 1957. His nationalist leadership in Egypt also brought admiration from both African leadership and the masses south of the Sahara. Still, this came at a cost for Ethiopia, as Nasser moved swiftly to establish nationalist control over the entire Nile valley. Meanwhile, Ethiopia’s relations with bordering Sudan after the conference also deteriorated as Selassie I’s government supported the southern, largely Christian, rebels in their struggle against the predominantly Muslim leadership in the north—a reflection on Ethiopia’s robust and at times tense relationship with the expansion of Islam. As a result, Ethiopia became both geographically and politically isolated in its quest to rebuild the nation.

Yet, Selassie I maintained that ‘international friendships can be strengthened and deepened by the personal exchange of ideas between leaders of nations.’ Just his luck, two years after the conference, Ghana, another African participant at Bandung, would gain independence under the Pan-Africanist leadership of Kwame Nkrumah, immediately followed by the successive wave of liberation of other African states. With the independence of these nations, pan-Africanism had been totally transformed from an ideological exercise into a conceivably potent political force. Amongst the wave of liberated African states, Nkrumah had emerged as a stronger alternative—not adversary—to Nasser’s geographically larger vision of a politically and perhaps topographically unified Afro-Asiatic world. With Nkrumah, then, an isolated Selassie I looking for third-world allyship had thus observed an inroad which would reinvigorate the dormant power of pan-Africanism witnessed during both Italian aggressions.

Yihun writes that, ‘Ethiopia’s leadership role in African politics was successfully launched in Accra in 1958,’ and was sustained through Selassie I’s practice of diplomacy. In April 1958, Nkrumah convened the first free African states in Accra: Liberia, Libya, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, Tunisia and Ethiopia. As the list of free African states grew, ideas on the most auspicious implementation of a united African front began to differ. The radical bloc pushed for swift unification of the continent, complete with one currency, military, and governing body, while the more moderate bloc espoused individual nationalism with strong mechanisms of continental economic and political cooperation. These groups became known as the Casablanca and Monrovia camps, respectively. Historian Michael Nigusie Kassaye writes that ‘in Addis Ababa, there was understanding that if [the] two opposing groups failed to reach a compromise, their confrontation would degenerate into a Pan-African conflict, as a result of which the Ethiopian Empire would inevitably suffer, as its territory was close to the hostile Middle East.’ It is indeed fair to say that Selassie I felt the pressure of isolation within an increasingly pan-Arab and Arab nationalist geography. Nevertheless, Selassie I was able to maintain a neutral position, which successfully prepared Ethiopia as an equally neutral territory for the first major meeting of the camps in 1963 in Addis Ababa—the founding of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU).

PAN-AFRICAN DIPLOMACY

Niguisie Kassaye writes that Yifru, Selassie I’s Foreign Minister, first began diplomatic relations with then-Guinean President Sekou Toure and his representative, Diallo Telli, the first secretary-general of the impending OAU. Conversations began in June 1962, in Asmara, Ethiopia’s ‘second major city.’ Successful in garnering support for Ethiopia as a neutral ground for a Pan-African conference of the proposed magnitude, Selassie I then ‘dispatched his Minister of Foreign Affairs with letters to all leaders of independent African Nations,’ to host a continental African summit in Addis Ababa. Ironically enough, Nasser was the first to respond to the call, prompting Yifru to undergo a pilgrimage of sorts, in which he visited and acquired agreement with Morocco, ‘Algeria, Tunisia, [and] countries of Western and Central Africa,’ ultimately leading to the confirmation of 32 heads of state to be present at the historic Pan-African conference.

Selassie I’s ability to lead the two camps into at least tentative cooperation through their appearance at the conference solidified his contribution to the pan-African imperative. For the next decade, a golden age of pan-Africanism, Selassie I would transform his diplomatic proclivities into efficient peacemaking strategies between fledging African states whose warring undermined the pan-African agenda. Yihun writes that he would see through ‘the successful mediation of the conflicts between Algeria and Morocco (1963), Ghana and Guinea (1966), Nigeria and Ivory Coast, Nigeria and the four states that supported the Biafra Republic (1967), the civil war of the Sudan (1972), and Uganda and Tanzania (1973).’

It is perhaps the diplomacy that Selassie I fostered between African states which influenced one of the chief successes of the OAU. According to historians, Victor Osaro Edo and Michael Abiodun Olanrewaju, this chief success was the organization’s ability to resolve intra-continental conflicts ‘in an African spirit without any foreign intervention.’ They write that they were able to resolve said conflicts through its ‘Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration Commission,’ which was ‘highly influenced by the emperor,’ ultimately receiving ‘commendation from the United Nations.’ As such, it was only through this high level of intra-continental diplomacy that there was now an organized front which had amassed enough power to acquire serious consideration on the international stage, particularly within the United Nations.

This was arguably a direct result of the emperor’s strategic political manoeuvring implanted at the very genesis of the OAU. During his historic speech in front of 32 African nations on 25 May 1963, Selassie I asserted that ‘quarrels’ between African states ‘must be confined to this continent and quarantined from the contamination of non-African interference,’ and therefore ‘procedures must be established for the peaceful settlement of disputes, in order that the threat or use of force may no longer endanger the peace of our continent.’

This verbal proclamation was part and parcel of the vision he outlined for an economically and politically cooperative Africa. He asserted that the purpose of the conference was ‘to lay the basis for African unity,’ and to ‘agree upon the basic instrument which will constitute the foundation for the future growth in peace and harmony and oneness of this continent.’ He went on to highlight several important elements necessary to achieve this oneness. This included ‘specialised [bodies] to facilitate and coordinate continent-wide programmes’ that oversaw ‘economic cooperation between African nations’ such as an ‘African Development Bank,’ ‘travel between African nations and telegraphic and telephonic communications,’ and an ‘African defence system.’ He lastly, and perhaps most significantly emphasized education as in need of ‘a massive effort…in the educational and cultural field which will not only raise the level of literacy and provide the cadres of skilled and trained technicians requisite to our growth and development but, as well, acquaint us one with another.’ He urged the fostering of a pan-African education through the establishment of an African University,

sponsored by all African States, where future leaders of Africa will be trained in an atmosphere of continental brotherhood. In this African institution, the supra-national aspects of African life would be emphasised and study would be directed toward the ultimate goal of complete African unity.

Indeed, education was so significant to Selassie I that it was the only initiative of which he volunteered to take leadership during that speech, asserting that ‘Ethiopia stands prepared here and now to decide on the site of the University and to fix the financial contributions to be made to it.’ In fact, Selassie I had been making several gains in education in his own country for decades prior.

PAN-AFRICAN EDUCATION

At the inauguration of Haile Selassie I University in 1949, the emperor asserted that ‘the salvation of [Ethiopia], as We have repeatedly stated to you, lies primarily in education.’ Yet, Girma Amare shares that even prior to Selassie I’s ascension to the throne in 1930, he sustained a firm but moderate approach towards modernization in which education took centre stage. When Selassie I was just Ras—a title equivalent to a provincial governor—Tafari Makonnen, he campaigned on and ‘maintained the view that…modernization should be blended with tradition to bring about an evolutionary development along a path appropriate to Ethiopia’s needs and historical experiences.’ In that sense, the medium which would stimulate technological advancement within the framework of ‘traditional’ principles and the historical conditions of Ethiopia would indeed be education. Once on the throne alongside his wife Empress Menen, writes Selassie I began the ‘controlled and supervised development of education,’ in which he ‘placed virtually all responsibilities for the control and financing of education in the hands of the state.’ They wasted little time implementing educational reforms, including the establishment of the first girls’ school in Ethiopia in 1931, named after the Empress.

After the Italian occupation, the Emperor and the Empress began rebuilding the nation again focusing on education. At this point, Eshete Tibebe suggests, the Emperor evolved past education for the advancement of Ethiopia only and began observing more broadly that:

Subscribe to our free newsletter

You're in — welcome to The Republic

Complete your onboarding

Read

Connect

Apps

More

Read

Connect

Apps

More

Haile Selassie I and Pan-African Diplomacy

INHERITING THE FUTURE

TOWARDS AFRICAN UNITY

PAN-AFRICAN DIPLOMACY

PAN-AFRICAN EDUCATION

You’ve Reached Your Limit of Free Reading.

Ad-Free Reading Experience

Unlimited Access to Exclusive Archives

In-Depth Deep-dive Reporting

You’ve Reached Your Limit of Free Reading.

Ad-Free Reading Experience

Unlimited Access to Exclusive Archives

In-Depth Deep-dive Reporting

Comments

SHOP THE REPUBLIC

Related Stories

Southwest Nigeria Is Not ‘Yorubaland’

The Betrayal of Mandela’s Apartheid Liberation Movement

Is This the Federation Nnamdi Azikiwe Fought For?

7 Books to Read if You Didn’t Study Nigerian History in School

The Rocky Independence of Congo-Brazzaville