After the Golden Era

Editor’s note: This essay is available in our print issue, A Nation Divided. Buy the issue here.

What Balewa’s administration could not achieve due to its short-lived tenure (he was assassinated in 1966), the Yakubu Gowon administration (1966-75), after the Civil War, would partly bring to fruition. The plan to forge an African Common Market, starting with an integrated sub-region to make Nigeria an industrial powerhouse spurred Gowon’s diplomatic alliances and politics in West Africa towards the realization of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1975.

Since 1975, however, Nigeria has neither become the major Black power it was expected to be nor the industrial powerhouse it sought to become. Not only has economic growth been five times slower since the turn of the current millennium, but investors’ confidence has also reduced and consequently Foreign Direct Investments. Nigeria saw a 69 per cent drop in its FDI from $2.3 billion in 2014 to $699 million in 2021. Not least, export value is on the decline. According to a recent Stears article, the volume of Nigeria’s export in 2021 ($47.3 billion) was 68 per cent lower than the number in 2012 ($146.4 billion). Nigeria only exports raw materials, not finished goods, and enduring challenges of insecurity, corruption, theft and vandalism have crippled its production capacity and consequently limited its earning potential.

By these accounts, it makes sense that the focus of the next president should be seeking long-term solutions to these domestic issues. Yet one ignored but equally important discussion point is the impact that Nigeria’s challenges have on the West African sub-region and the benefits regional stability and integration would have on Nigeria’s domestic and international interests. Nigerian politics matter at home and abroad, particularly for West Africa. Likewise, West Africa’s stability or otherwise matters and has real implications for Nigeria. Unlike the Muhammadu Buhari administration, Nigeria’s next administration cannot afford to neglect foreign policy in favour of an overemphasis on domestic issues.

A stable Nigeria is crucial to the progress of West Africa and vice versa. Therefore, leaders cannot continue to treat regional issues with disinterest or little interest at best. Alongside fostering peace and development at home, the incoming president should also develop a bold and assertive foreign policy for West Africa. Top on the agenda should be rallying West African leaders to forge a common defence policy to address insecurity and terrorism; more active participation in peacekeeping through ECOWAS and African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council where Nigeria is the longest-serving member, and more effort to coordinate regional integration through cultural education.

The traditional argument is that Nigeria needs to resolve its internal issues before it can address external concerns. However, foreign affairs are not unconnected to Nigeria’s domestic realities. Therefore, the challenge before the next president is to develop unique strategies to address both domestic and foreign issues concurrently.

The question about the role of big states in Africa has been on for several years. Countries like Nigeria, with economic and political clout, are expected to step up to influence reforms across the continent. Nigeria in previous years has lived up to such expectations. In past years, Nigeria has constantly leveraged political and economic influence to advance its national interest but also foster regional cooperation and advocate for African development. Several regional and continental initiatives have been launched in Nigeria or driven by the Nigerian governments of the past.

Nigeria was crucial to the formation of ECOWAS in 1975, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1963 which later became the AU in 2002, and the African Development Bank in 1964. During the military rule, Nigeria worked to ensure stability in West Africa deploying troops and funds through the ECOWAS Monitoring Group to end civil wars in Liberia under Ibrahim Babangida’s regime in 1990 and Sierra Leone under Sani Abacha’s regime in 1998. Nigeria was also well-positioned as a defender of democracy and peace and stability within the continent in the years since the return to democracy, particularly under Olusegun Obasanjo’s administration. An example was when the then-president of São Tomé and Príncipe, Fradique de Menezes, was ousted in a bloodless coup in 2003. Menezes was visiting President Obasanjo in Nigeria to discuss oil development when the coup happened. Nigeria with other African and international partners worked to restore São Tomé’s president a week later, with Obasanjo escorting him back to his country in the presidential jet.

Through the years, Obasanjo was the president who really advanced a conscientious foreign policy. The end of his tenure in 2007 is now synonymous with the end of the golden era of Nigeria’s foreign policy. Nigeria’s past international engagements have not been without criticisms though. There was opposition from members of the public to the peacekeeping missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone mainly on the grounds of corruption and lack of freedom at home. Obasanjo was often criticized for placing foreign considerations above domestic issues.

During his first few years in office, President Muhammadu Buhari showed enthusiasm on working with regional leaders. He pushed for a multilateral approach to addressing insecurity through the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), which was launched in 2014 with three other Lake Chad countries, Chad, Cameroon and Niger. His enthusiasm and prioritization of regional cooperation then showed in his visits to Chad, Cameroon, Benin and Niger as soon as he assumed office from June to August 2015. He also disbursed funds in 2015, $21 million out of $100 million pledged to the MNJTF. His efforts then boosted the morale of the leaders and troops of the other countries that made up the MNJTF.

But since then, the MNJTF has been plagued by poor funding, the military offensives have not been properly coordinated, and historical and ongoing mistrust due to border disputes, and inadequate support among member countries have led to reduced collaboration and intelligence sharing. As a result, the MNJTF, which started with some victory over Boko Haram, has been unable to conquer the jihadist group. Rather, Boko Haram has split into multiple factions.

In December 2019, Chad recalled more than 1,000 of its troops from Nigeria without adequate communication with other MNJTF members. Then Chadian president, Idriss Déby, complained that his troops did most of the fighting with insufficient support from Nigeria or its neighbours.  The perception was that the Nigerian side showed little effort and its weakness to handle the crisis continued to cause resentment about the spillage of the Boko Haram crisis to the Lake Chad region.

In recent years, Nigeria has been silent on the international front. There has not been a major effort to address cross-border insecurity and terrorism crises from Buhari’s government, beyond vows and calls for cooperation at regional events. There was an instance when President Buhari donated N1.4 billion worth of vehicles to Niger Republic, which could be considered a misplaced priority. While this shows in some sense a renewed, if late, commitment to cultivating regional relationships again, the move arguably was not adequately calculated and not properly communicated. Nigeria was also hesitant and was one of the last to join the African Continental Free Trade Area, even though there has been  sustained advocacy for an African common market since Balewa’s administration.