From the OAU to the AU

Editor’s note: This essay is available in our print issue, Pan-African Dreams. Buy the issue here.

At the formation of the AU in 2002, the existing presupposition was that the rampant internal conflicts rife in Africa would be handled differently, and indeed it was. How much better? This is the question that must be answered. To avoid repeating its predecessor’s mistakes, the AU committed to conflict intervention in African states through its principle of non-indifference as a core part of its operation. In deviation from the standard of the OAU, the AU, at its inception, declared the union’s right to ‘intervene in domestic affairs of member states in cases of ‘war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and serious threats to legitimate order.’ In light of this commitment, the Peace and Security Council (PSC) was established within the organization to make important decisions about where, when, and how to handle conflict and security issues on the continent.

The OAU’s response to coups on the continent in the 1960s through the late 1990s was blatant indifference. Irrespective of the internal state of affairs in member states, the OAU carried on its operations, allowing governments who were a product of coups to attend policy meetings and participate in other organizational activities. While there were occasional disputes regarding the participation of coup-producing government representatives at OAU summits, in line with its principle of non-interference, the organization made no move to declare the illegitimacy of these unconstitutional governments, allowing whichever government was in charge of ruling a country at the approach of each new day represent the country’s interest as if nothing had happened. For instance, in 1982, after a Hissène Habré-led coup usurped the government of President Goukouni Oueddei in Chad, two delegations from the opposing sides demanded to participate at the OAU summit as representatives of Chad. The summit was divided into those who were in support of Habré and those who were in support of Oueddei. Nevertheless, the position of the OAU remained non-interference as the change of government was an internal state affair. Hence, Habre’s delegation was allowed to participate in the summit.

Moreover, in other instances when there had been disagreements over the presence of a coup-producing government at the organization’s summit, like in the case of the National Liberation Council (NLC), which overthrew Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana in 1966, the issue was more about the NLC’s possible collusion with Western governments than their illegitimacy. Similar controversies that separated the organization into factions were replicated in 1971 after the coup led by Idi Amin Dada Oumee in Uganda and in 1980 after the Samuel Doe-led coup in Liberia. Nevertheless, the result was always the authorization of the new government regardless of its illegality. This is understandable, considering that the OAU’s position was that change of government was an internal affair; hence, they could not interfere.

An outlier to this general principle of non-interference and a revision in the OAU’s stance on unconstitutional change in government was in the case of Sierra Leone in 1997. At the time, a coup led by Major Johnny Paul Koroma overthrew the government of Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, which had been pivotal in ending the country’s six-year civil war. In an action that portrayed the OAU had had enough, the organization declared the government change illegitimate. The OAU called for a return to constitutional government and asked that the international community within Africa and beyond disavow the new government. Eventually, the constitutional government of Kabbah was reinstated in 1998. Following this and the establishment of the Lomé Declaration in 2000, the organization’s principle evolved to a disavowal of unconstitutional regimes and a requirement of such regimes to return to constitutional order within six months or risk suspension and sanctions from the organization.

One can hardly blame the organization for its decision to remain indifferent despite the widespread illegitimate replacement of governments in Africa between the 1960s and the 1980s. For one, the scale at which coups took place on the continent in this period meant that almost every country on the continent, at one point or the other, had a coup attempt, many of which were successful. Hence, if the OAU delegitimized governments from coups, where would it have gotten its members? For example, Nigeria would have been intermittently unrepresented in the organization; the same for Ghana, Togo, Sierra Leone, Ethiopia, and several others; and what is an international organization without its member states? More so, other sub-regional organizations, such as the Economic Community of Central African States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Arab Maghreb Union, were vying for the attention of member states. As the OAU was nothing but the cooperation of the same leaders carrying out these coups, to speak out against one could mean to speak against themselves.

However, if the reluctance to act in the case of coups can be attributed to a desire not to stomp on one’s foot, what can be said about the OAU’s response to other forms of conflict on the continent? For instance, the position of the OAU on interference extended to several other disputes on the continent like the Rwandan genocide (1994), the conflict in Burundi (1993-2005), the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia (1977-1978), and Ethiopia and Eritrea (1998-2000). Many of these intra-state conflicts and some inter-state received attention as observer missions and peace talks, some of which were pivotal in alleviating the tension but were ineffective in bringing about peace. For instance, in the inter-state conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the OAU developed a framework proposal for resolving the dispute, which remained unused for nine months. Again, at the start of the conflict brewing in Rwanda, the OAU set up several summits and mediations between the government and the aggrieved Tutsi, which did not produce positive results. When conflict eventually broke out in Rwanda, the OAU, like the rest of the international community, stood by.

Arguably, it is essential to consider that the OAU’s position of non-interference may have averted possibly catastrophic interventions that a lack of political will and a significant lack of resources could have hindered. The significantly limited resources, particularly in arms required for military intervention, may have posed more of a security risk to Africa and the troops sent if the OAU decided to intervene militarily in all the conflicts on the continent. In the instances where the organization did intervene in internal state conflicts both as the OAU and as the AU, this lack of resources played out in its inability to properly handle the extent of these conflicts. For instance, in the Chadian conflict, where the OAU was initially reluctant to interfere, six countries—Benin, Guinea, Togo, Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire—were to contribute troops to the peacekeeping force sent to Chad. Eventually, only Nigeria, Senegal, and Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo) could contribute troops, with the Nigerian forces being streamlined from 8,000 to 2,000 and the other countries contributing 600 and 700 troops, respectively. The OAU peacekeeping force in Chad failed to resolve the conflict in the country and, due to weak institutions, authority, and limited resources, contributed to the overthrow of the legitimate Chadian government. Less severely, in 2003, the AU Mission to Burundi, although primarily a success in negotiating a ceasefire between the warring Hutus and Tutsis, was significantly lacking in equipment, food, medicine, and other funds because the funds expected from Western organizations like the European Union and the World Health Organization arrived late.

The OAU’s decision to act against the 1997 coup in Sierra Leone was arguably a turning point in the organization’s stance on non-intervention in internal affairs. The eventual transition to becoming the AU in 2002 sealed this position. The AU’s response to coups in member states differed utterly from the OAU. Through the PSC, the AU imposed sanctions on member states where coups occurred. A good example was the coup in Togo in 2005, where Faure Gnassingbé, the son of the previous Togolese president, Gnassingbé Eyadéma, was installed as president by the Togolese Armed Forces, disregarding plans for a democratic election. The PSC condemned the coup, suspended Togo from AU activities, demanded a constitutional succession, and collaborated with ECOWAS to impose an arms embargo and travel ban on Togolese leaders. All these pressures eventually led to the resignation of the coup-imposed government and the organization of a democratic election. The AU’s actions were replicated in Mauritania in 2009 when the PSC suspended Mauritania from the organization’s activities. The PSC also imposed visa denials and travel restrictions and froze the assets of everyone involved in the unconstitutional government of General Mohamed Ould Aziz, who had come in through a coup, eventually resulting in democratic elections. The AU’s modus operandi concerning coups remains unchanged, as seen in the 2008 coup in Guinea, the 2005 coup in Togo, and the 2015 coup in Burkina Faso.