The Case for Affirmative Action

Affirmative action is a policy that was first initiated by Lydon B. Johnson, the 36th president of the United States, in 1965 when he issued Executive Order 11246. Affirmative action aims not just to repair the historical injustices that are sexism, slavery, and racism (and to some extent, colonialism) but also to increase access to educational opportunities, equal employment, and other opportunities for underrepresented groups that continue to face the adverse effects of historical injustices.

Although the Supreme Court ruling against affirmative action is recent, the antagonism affirmative action faces can be traced to the 20th century, when the policy was first introduced. In his 1998 influential paper, ‘The Case Against Affirmative Action’, American political theorist, Louis Pojman, argues that when we consider that the statement ‘two wrongs do not make a right’ is a good moral assumption and preferential treatment is wrong, any justification that the proponents of affirmative action might hold becomes null. But what do people opposed to affirmative action get wrong about it?

The arguments of opponents of affirmative action are explicitly dedicated to undermining the position that under the condition of a past injustice that puts a person, S, in an underrepresented group, we ought to treat S with more leniency than we would treat a person, P, who does not satisfy the condition of being affected by past injustices when they apply to the same job or school for admission. Since sexism, slavery, and racism are what belong to this class of historical injustices, antagonists of affirmative action do argue that the preferential treatment that (white) women, Black people, people of colour, and indigenous people get is detrimental to white males—especially white males that are hardworking and who in no way participated in those historical injustices that they have been asked to bear its consequences. Thus, opponents of affirmative action argue that it is both racist and sexist since it applies against white males and, thus, is bad for propagating a just society. The exemption of white males from benefiting directly from affirmative action is predicated on the historical fact that white males are the main perpetrators of these historical injustices and the fact that white males are better off in the United States (and most societies) shows how they have benefitted from historical injustices that are slavery, sexism, and colonialism. (To be clear, I do not mean past white males are the only perpetrators of these historical injustices. Most African societies, for instance, are misogynistic—even up till today).

The anti-affirmative action group argues that we must differentiate between promoting equal opportunity in a polity and the preferential treatment that requires an individual or institution to discriminate against the people presumed to be better off in a society in favour of underrepresented groups suffering from historical injustices. The difference is between what they call ‘strong affirmative action’ and ‘weak affirmative action’. Strong affirmative action refers to preferential treatment that requires an individual or institution to discriminate against the people presumed to be better off in a society in favour of underrepresented groups suffering from historical injustices. Weak affirmative action, on the other hand, refers to the promotion of equal opportunity in a polity. The group accepts that the latter is needed for a just society but rejects the former on the basis that it is both racist and sexist since it applies to white males and, thus, is bad for propagating a just society.

These arguments beg the question: is equal opportunity enough when it has been established that—as a matter of history—the playing ground has an unjust foundation? If fairness is a kind of justice, and justice is a virtue that cannot be overridden in a society that presumes that justice is needed to lead flourishing lives, then, as Canadian-British political philosopher and social theorist, Christine Sypnowich, argues, merely relying on providing citizens with the chance to live a flourishing life cannot be enough. Our social organization—and even our distribution of resources in such social organization—ought to centre around fairness by taking into account that the outcomes ought to be equal, especially given that certain (historical) injustices have occurred. As a society that upholds justice as a virtue, we should focus on what opportunity achieves, not just on making opportunities available for everyone. It is one thing to say that ‘no one is stopping Travis, a black boy in Alabama, from becoming a Harvard Professor of Mathematics since he can easily study hard to achieve such a feat and compete with others for the same position.’ It is another thing to understand and acknowledge that there are socio-economic factors, rooted in historical exploitations that impede Travis from achieving such a feat that will not impede Charles, a white boy from Washington DC.

​​​In his critique against affirmative action, Pojman first assesses some key arguments for it. These include the views that: underrepresented groups need role models in social institutions; there is a need for compensation for historical injustices; there is a need for compensation from those who innocently benefitted from past injustice; there is a need to ensure diversity in social institutions; there is a need for citizens’ equal rights; the ‘no one deserves his talent’ argument against meritocracy. These first six are negative: he uses them to show that the best arguments for affirmative action fail. Pojman also puts forward three arguments against the practice, noting that affirmative action requires discrimination against a different group; encourages mediocrity & incompetence; and that there is strong evidence to support the observable value in the principle of merit and practice of awarding of positions on its basis. Overall, the nine arguments are intended to demonstrate that the policies opposing affirmative action fulfil the justificatory demands they provoke. These arguments can be taken as representative, but not exhaustive, of the anti-affirmative action group.

I do not think that affirmative action might be the best way to achieve a just or equal society, or economic sufficiency for underrepresented groups. Nevertheless, the reasons the anti-affirmative action group gives do not state clearly how affirmative action fails to aid in building a more just society. The arguments against affirmative action—including those of the US Supreme Court justices who voted against affirmative action—run on fallacies and misinterpretation of the authentic goals of affirmative action.

First, the anti-affirmative action group misses the point when they argue that affirmative action is racist and sexist. Racism is rooted in discrimination based on the belief that a particular group or individual is inferior to another group or individual. Affirmative actions that work against white males are not rooted in a sense of superiority, inferiority, or dominance. Instead, it is an attempt to build a more just society, given certain injustices that occurred in the past. Perhaps from another vantage point, a policy that works against white males could be seen as racist. But that would mean we need to do away with our conceptions of what racism is, and we need to offer another socio-ontological theory on how to see racism and what counts as racism. If racism and slavery are rooted in a sense of racial superiority and inferiority, then preferential treatment on the grounds of building a more just society—which is what affirmative action does—would fail to qualify as racism. Given this point, even the claim that affirmative action is (reverse) racism is not justified.

The anti-affirmative action groups also fail to recognize one of the most important reasons for affirmative action: Representation. One of the major reasons for affirmative action is that a lack of representation in social institutions runs counter to building a just society, and this harms marginalized people. The anti-affirmative action group would argue that representation does not override competence. But this would mean neglecting the veracity of standpoint epistemology, which suggests that marginalized people are more situated to represent and proclaim their experiences. Thus, marginalized people must have access to the appropriate resources—education, jobs, housing, etc.—that would make them offer profound suggestions while engaging social institutions and while speaking in elite spaces, a space that does not only anchor social organization but also responsible for making and maintaining a just society.