Niger: Whose Constitutional Order?

The Niger coup started with members of the presidential guard putting the president under house arrest in the early hours of 26 July 2023, with the Presidential Guards, under the command of General Abdourahmane Tchiani, announcing that they had taken over. The military later confirmed its support of the takeover explaining that it had been forced to take action due to poor socio-economic governance and the continued deterioration of security in the country. It informed that Niger would respect the country’s international obligations but warned against external intervention.

The coup and the support it got from the population informed of the deep socio-economic fissures that were inherent in Nigerian society. While the ousted president was praised for having reduced terrorist attacks and brought stability, there were still a few recorded cases leading to displacement. There was also rising and growing dissent against the French army personnel in the country which attracted some isolated protests from members of the public for the withdrawal of French forces and French domination.

The military takeover of power in Niger attracted various responses from the global community. The responses were mostly influenced by the various interests of the respective countries or regional blocs and also the geopolitical importance of Niger. There was the usual condemnation, especially from the EU, ECOWAS, and the UN. These condemnations are based on the established norms of not encouraging the various unconstitutional changes in governments as enshrined in various constitutive charters of the multilateral and regional institutions. There were also unique responses to various players in the region.

The ECOWAS region took a hard stance against the coup. The regional body ordered that the military relinquish power to the ousted president and return the country to ‘constitutional order’. The regional body threatened that failure to return the country to constitutionality would drive it to use any means necessary including military intervention. The threat was continuously repeated without much move from Niamey. What was clear was that the region was divided on the subject of using military force. The pro-France members of the bloc, comprising Benin, Ivory Coast and Senegal, pushed hard for a military intervention. However, this was countered by senatorial opinion in Nigeria, where members of the senate advised against the military intervention on 5 August 2023 and recommended the use of all possible diplomatic channels and options. The coup governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea also informed of their support to Niger in case of any military intervention. On 16 September 2023, Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger signed a mutual defence pact to mutually assist each other against insurgency and external aggression to any one of the member states. The mutual defence pact targeted both the threat of any increase in terrorism that may also be externally sponsored to destabilize the military rules and also the threat of military intervention in Niger from ECOWAS which was seen as also a threat to Mali and Burkina Faso if ever it succeeded in turning over the Niger coup. Niger accused France of releasing terrorists who were in custody, a move seen as an act of destabilization of Niger to create a façade of increased terrorist threat after the coup. Algeria, a non-member of ECOWAS but a strategic country in the unfolding events due to its bordering with Niger and also being on the belt of the Trans-Saharan gas pipeline from Nigeria announced its disapproval of a military intervention. The military intervention proposal and threat was therefore a monumental failure which only helped to embolden the coup leadership which secured support from the civilian population against any military intervention and threatened to kill Bazoum if there was any military intervention.

Perhaps the regional body was more successful with economic sanctions. Being one of the least developed countries in Africa and a landlocked country, Niger was vulnerable to regional economic sanctions. It depended on Nigeria for approximately 70 per cent of its electricity needs. ECOWAS and the West Africa Monetary and Economic Union imposed financial sanctions that saw the freezing of all commercial transactions with Niger, suspended all financial assistance with regional banks, and froze all state and state enterprises’ assets in various commercial banks and also state assets in the regional central bank. Due to its leverage on electricity supply, Nigeria cut off electricity which saw Niger losing 70 per cent of its electricity supply. All borders were closed, a situation which had also been commanded by the junta after the threats of military intervention. The sanctions system was meant to act as a form of modern-day siege against an uncompromising member. However, sanctions would hurt more on the civilians and this was true in Niger where even the UN noted that the humanitarian crisis was worsening.

Externally, the strongest condemnation came from France, the former colonial master. France enjoyed post-colonial trade preferences in Niger. The coup leaders rode on the anti-French sentiment that engulfed not only Niger but a number of the former French colonies in the region. Having legitimized its actions on anti-French sentiment meant that the leaders had to be hard on France, which meant France had to be hard against the coup. France, like all other countries, condemned the coup and called for the return to the ‘constitutional order’ by unconditionally restoring toppled president, Bazoum.

France went on to reject various orders which were being given by the new leadership as it argued that they recognized the ousted president who was the legitimate leader. A long standoff was experienced when France refused to withdraw its military forces from Niger and also to withdraw its ambassador in Niamey, as had been ordered by the military leadership. France only capitulated to the orders on 24 September 2023, after prolonged protests as well as de-facto sieges on the ambassador and the military base by the pro-coup protesters. France encouraged Bazoum not to resign as had been the trend in Mali where ousted presidents resigned under house arrests, thereby giving partial legitimacy to the coup. With the president still holding on to the claim of presidency, France would claim to be working with the legitimate orders from Bazoum and not from the illegitimate military rulers.

The EU responded by condemning the coup and noted that it would not recognize the military rulers. The regional body suspended all financial aid and cooperation on security. The EU imposed sanctions against the new military leadership and noted that it would continue taking cues from ECOWAS on further punitive measures that would help return the country to ‘democratic order’. Josep Borrell, the foreign policy chief of the EU also revealed that the regional body might consider financial assistance to ECOWAS military intervention.

The EU had a cocktail of aid to the country that included Official Development Assistance. Among these was the EU budgetary support of US$ 554 million which targeted improvement of governance, education and sustainable growth. This support was for the years 2021-2024. Additionally, the bloc, through the European Peace Facility, had approved €70 million for support to the armed forces since July 2022. The bloc also had a small contingent of military personnel, numbering between 50 and 100 under the EU Military Partnership Mission in Niger. The personnel were tasked with training programmes on anti-terrorism.

The various sanctions which were imposed by the countries and regional groups were meant to squeeze out the resilience of the military so that it would withdraw its takeover of power and capitulate to the demands of restoring power to Bazoum. The sanctions by the operation mostly affect civilians more than the leadership. It might therefore be concluded that the sanctions meant to bring hardship on the people so that they would withdraw their support for the government. Such a move is just a modern way of implementing medieval sieges.

The US took a somewhat, middle of the line response to the coup. The government made spirited attempts to convince the military to restore Bazoum to power by dispatching diplomats. Antony Blinken, the US Secretary of State made public statements that the US was against the military takeover and that it was in communication with both Bazoum and the military leadership. Among the known top diplomats who were dispatched to Niamey in attempts to restore the Bazoum presidency was the then-acting deputy secretary of state, Victoria Nuland. While the details of the meeting between Nuland and the representatives of the military government leadership were not made public, one can conclude that Nuland’s mission included issuing threats and seeking concessions with the military leadership on safeguarding US interests in the region, as shown by her statement to the media that her conversations with members of the military were extremely frank and at times quite difficult, adding that if they took the path of military rule then that path would threaten US cooperation with Niger going into the future. Among the US interests to be guarded included ensuring the continued active operation of the US bases in the country and concessions that Niamey would not invite the deployment of Russian military personnel in the country.

However, unlike other countries, the US did not declare the unfolding events as a coup. Declaring the events as a coup would have meant cutting off various aid dispensations which included military aid and cooperation. This was not the first time that the US responded to its national self-interests by playing semantics with known facts. In 2013, the Obama government denied accepting that the military takeover of power in Egypt against the democratically elected president, Muhammed Morsi was a coup, and also did not declare the events in Chad in 2021 as a coup. The major concern of the US was the spread of Russian influence in the region, and a fear that the Russian Wagner Group would be invited to fill in the void left by the French troops and also the US troops if they were to be asked to withdraw or if they withdraw on their own. The US government was reported to have dispatched a delegation to ensure that the new military leadership would not seek Wagner or Russian deployments in the country.

The responses to the coup noted above were not out of the desire to see Nigeriens being governed by an elected president, at least one can argue. The various regional and international players had vested self-interests, or at least were responding to some external powers who had vested interests in Niger. Self-interests of various players influenced how they reacted and responded to the military takeover. Of note were the regional economic communities, the leading West African regional hegemony, Nigeria, the pro-France countries and ECOWAS, France as the former colonial master and the US and Russia, all with vested and varied interests in the region.