What is African Philosophy?

Identifying/qualifying Philosophy with the adjective African [invariably constructing what is known as ‘African Philosophy’] has been a matter of contention in both African and non-African academic circles for over five decades now—although, the African voices have been the loudest. The debate has ranged from questioning the core of both terms and enquiring what such expression [that is, African Philosophy] means, to probing the canon of this philosophy, in fact, asking if there is a canon at all. Other questions often asked include; does African Philosophy live up to the ‘modern’ practice of philosophy as found in Western (and even non-Western) universities (and academic discourse)? Are oral traditions qualified to be categorized with modern written philosophical traditions? Who were the ‘philosophers’ that developed these African Philosophies and while developing these ideas, did they confirm themselves as doing philosophy or refer to the ideas as philosophical? If the answers to these questions were in black-and-white yes or no patterns, I would have simply responded in that fashion, depending on the side of the debate I stand with and simply let you move on to the next essay you need to read (actually, attempts at responding to these questions have successfully raised more questions!). But as the case often is with debates, there is much to be said. From that much, let’s explore a little here.

Historically, it is not new to qualify philosophy with specific [regional] labels. As it’s almost a consensus within the broader field of African philosophy, philosophers’ philosophizing is always the process of contending with the realities of the various regions that each philosopher philosophizes within. On qualifying philosophy with specific labels, Eritrean philosopher, Tsenay Serequeberhan, writes; ‘In the history of philosophy and presently, ethnic qualifiers have been and are still operative with regard to designating specific philosophical perspectives.’ Serequeberhan goes further to mention some examples, ‘…Jewish, Arabic/Islamic, Medieval/Christian, European, German, Greek, Oriental, American…’ [Philosophies]; he goes further to explain what these qualifiers do, stating that: ‘…all these ethnic, religious, continental qualifiers designate the specificity of a philosophical perspective in terms of the background culture or tradition within which and out of which a particular philosophical discourse is articulated.’ Serequeberhan’s point is presumably clear: the point of qualifying a philosophy with a specific label, is not some kind of fancy naming, but a matter of functionality and, to use his word, ‘specificity’. This general practice, it appears, immediately bails Africa from the accusations of ‘being reactionary’ (to particularly, Western Philosophy[ers]) by labelling its philosophy as African. But this barely pinches the real matter within the debate—naming is tertiary in the order of importance within this discourse. Most, (if not all) groups in the debate are agreed on what philosophy in Africa (by Africans) should be called—African. The main contention arises at the juncture of meaning—what does African Philosophy mean? What ‘is’ African Philosophy? As commonly expressed in Nigerian Pidgin English, ‘na here everybody eye go red!’—which loosely translates as, ‘this is where rubber hits the road’.

As the word philosophy in popular Nigerian culture is generally and popularly linked to simply ‘one’s view of life’, the rigour that necessarily describes philosophizing can be (and often is) watered down to simply the word worldview. Now, there are possible instances where this sort of synonymous usage can be allowed, but within, especially the circle of academics and ‘professional’ African philosophers, worldview is only but a topic within larger philosophical discourses—philosophy has a more sophisticated meaning than simply ‘one’s view/opinions about life’. Ghanaian philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, proffers some helpful insights; ‘[P]hilosophy as an academic discipline is relatively young in most parts of Africa south of the Sahara.’ And it is the various meanings that philosophy garners within this context that differs from popular usage—Wiredu further adds:

Here we are faced with a usage of the word [philosophy] that overlaps with the word worldview. Wiredu’s synonymous usage of the phrase ‘world outlook’, suggests a similar usage of worldview to denote philosophy. To further clarify, Wiredu continues; ‘Implied here is a contrast between two senses of the word ‘philosophy,’ one narrow and the other broad.’ The two senses that we began exploring above. He further makes the contrast:

Here we encounter the more sophisticated [academic] usage and the more mundane, day-to-day usage. In furtherance, Wiredu, explained how each sense of the usage, acts upon the other in certain ways. Then he gives a disclaimer, stating that; ‘The distinction between the two senses of ‘philosophy’ is not to be taken as a rigid one, for they shade into one another by insensible degrees.’ It suffices to say that philosophy can be understood within the confines of academic discourse and also as anyone’s view of life out there in the streets—however, none of the meanings should be isolated, absolutized and tagged, the meaning of philosophy. An oversimplification that refers to philosophy as simply one’s view of life alone, pushes the discipline out of its technical and sophisticated domain, while an exclusively elitist definition that isolates the term only to academic rigour is likely to thwart the practicality of sophisticated discourse that is often intended for transformation in public life! But what then is African Philosophy?

We have considered (quite briefly) what philosophy is in general. But what is African Philosophy? Nigerian intellectual historian, Toyin Falola responds to this question by saying; ‘Defining African philosophy is more challenging than it seems…’ he then quotes, ‘Mawere and Tubaya’ saying; ‘…the question of what constitutes African philosophy will ‘boggle minds for many more years to come.’ However, it can be easily said that African philosophy is philosophy done by Africans. This view is particularly propounded by the Beninese philosopher, Paulin J. Hountondji. Hountondji contends that content does little to qualify whether a philosophy is African or not, but the location/nationality of the doer of the philosophy [the philosopher] is what counts in qualifying an African Philosophy as distinct from any other. According to Hountondji, ‘A work like Bantu Philosophy’, a pioneering text in the field of [modern] African Philosophy written by the Belgian priest, Father Placide Temples, ‘…does not belong to African philosophy, since its author is not African; but Kagame’s work is an integral part of African philosophical literature.’ For clarity, Hountondji belongs to a school of African philosophy that is called ‘Professional Philosophy’. This group of philosophers, often including names like, ‘…Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu and Henry Odera Oruka…’, as interpreted by Serequeberhan, see themselves, though he exempts Oruka on this particular claim, as the earliest pioneers of modern philosophic thought in Africa. This is because they often consider only the current modern trend in African academic circles [and elsewhere] as what can be referred to as philosophy; to them, the documentation of wisdom/myths/folktales from African pasts is not a philosophical, but an anthropological (and ethnographical) enterprise—thus, Hountondji’s popular derogatory coinage, Ethnophilosophy. Back to Hountondji’s idea of African philosophy as philosophy done strictly by Africans, he comments further; ‘Thus Tempels’s work, although it deals with an African subject and has played a decisive role in the development of African ethnophilosophy, belongs to European scientific literature…’—a possible reason for such assertion, I think, is because as a non-African, any author who writes about Africa, writes within the academic tradition s/he belongs to and such research is necessarily Asian/European/American, whichever the case may be. To further solidify his arguments he writes: